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Abstract 
 
Canada between 1945 and 2010 has been classified as a prominent "middle power." At the same 
time its relative standing among nations has been declining and it has less regard in the world than 
it once did. Middle power theory seeks to classify those nations who in the wake of the Second 
World War were neither great powers nor non- great powers.  
 
The idea of middlepowermanship greatly appealed to Canadians and they undertook initiatives to 
separate themselves from the non-great powers. Canada is often seen as the exemplary case for 
observing middle power status. Through the post war era and the Cold War Canada was both 
economically and politically powerful. By getting involved in a plethora of multi-lateral bodies 
such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth while promoting peacekeeping and mediation, 
Canada was able to exert its growing influence on the world order. Throughout this time Canada 
worked hard to build its reputation as a mediator and specialized in ending quarrels. This is true of 
Canada’s involvement in the Commonwealth in the 1960s and 1970s with regard to the Rhodesian 
question.  On two separate occasions it was the Canadian contingents that prevented the 
Commonwealth from dissipating. This further bolstered Canada’s rise to prominence in the world 
order.  
 
Over the years, as Canada took on more initiatives resources became very thinly spread.  With an 
economic slow down and new commitments to national policies (universal healthcare and pensions) 
the Canadian budget was rearranged and priorities changed. No longer were there the same 
resources available to middle power initiatives or the military. This has greatly impacted Canada’s 
ability to participate in international projects.  
 
Recently, Canada’s position in the world has come into question, asking whether or not it truly is 
still a middle power. By looking at various traditional middle power elements including the 
economy, peacekeeping, official development assistance and involvement in multilateral bodies it 
can be seen that Canada’s prominence is waning. Using the case study of Zimbabwean/ Canadian 
relations through the 20th and 21st centuries, the decline of Canada’s middle power performance can 
be traced. Combining these different themes with hard and soft power theory it is clear to see that 
Canada no longer holds the same position of middle power it once did. It also shows that Canadians 
are holding onto an image of Canada, which is dated, and it is time to redefine Canada’s position 
within the world order.  
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Opsomming 
 
Tussen 1945 en 2010 is Kanada geklassifiseer as ’n prominente “middelmag.” Terselfdertyd het 
Kanada se relatiewe posisie ten opsigte van ander nasies begin afneem en minder aansien in die 
wêreld geniet as voorheen. Die middelmag-teorie poog om daardie nasies te klassifiseer wat na die 
Tweede Wêreldoorlog nóg grootmagte, nóg kleinmagte was.     
 
Die Kanadese was aangetrokke tot die idee van middelmagskap en hulle het inisiatiewe onderneem 
om hulself van ander nie-grootmagte te onderskei. Kanada word dikwels gesien as die toonbeeld 
van die middelmag rol. Gedurende die post-oorlog era, asook tydens die Koue Oorlog was Kanada 
beide ekonomies en polities invloedryk. Deur betrokke te raak in multi-laterale instellings soos die 
Verenigde Nasies en die Statebond, en terselfdertyd vredeskepping en bemiddeling te bevorder, kon 
Kanada sy groeiende invloed op die wêreld orde uitoefen. Gedurende hierdie tyd het Kanada hard 
gewerk om sy reputasie as bemiddelar gestand te doen en te spesialiseer in die beëindiging van 
dispute. Laasgenoemde word veral waargeneem in Kanada se betrokkenheid in die Statebond met 
betrekking tot die Rhodesië-vraagstuk in die 1960s en 1970s. Op twee verskillende geleenthede was 
dit die Kanadese invloed wat verhoed het dat die Statebond ontbind. Dit het gesorg dat Kanada se 
prestige en prominensie in die wêreld orde toegeneem het.  
  
Oor die jare het Kanada meer inisiatiewe aangegaan en het die hulpbronne verminder. Dit, tesame 
met ’n stadige groeiende ekonomie en nuwe nasionale verpligtinge soos universele gesondheidsorg 
en pensioenfonds moes die Kanadese begroting herrangskik word en prioriteite moes verander. 
Daar was nie meer dieselfde hulpbronne beskikbaar vir middelmag- inisiatiewe of die weermag nie. 
Dit het grootliks Kanada se vermoë beïnvloed om aan internasionale inisiatiewe deel te neem.   
 
Onlangs het Kanada se posisie in die wêreld onder die loep gekom, en dit word bevraagteken of 
Kanada nog werklik ’n middelmag is. Deur te kyk na verskillende tradisionele middelmag- 
elemente soos die ekonomie, vredeskepping, amptelike ontwikkelingsbystand en die betrokkenheid 
in die multilaterale organisasies, word dit waargeneem dat Kanada se prominensie afneem. Deur 
gebruik te maak van die gevallestudie van die Zimbabwe/Kanada-verhoudinge deur die 20ste en 
21ste eeu, kan die afname van Kanada se middelmag-funksie waargeneem word. Met die 
kombinering van reeds genoemde temas met die teorieë van harde en sagte mag, kan dit duidelik 
gesien word dat Kanada nie meer dieselfde posisie van middelmag beklee wat dit eens gehad het 
nie. Verder wys dit dat die Kanadese aan ’n beeld van Kanada vasklou wat ouderwets is, en dat dit 
tyd is om Kanada se posisie te herdefinieer in die huidige wêreld orde. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Middle power theory has been an ever-changing field of study since it emerged to prominence in 
the post World War Two era. Canada has often been regarded as the exemplary case when 
investigating middle power status. Through its middle power position in the world order Canada has 
acquired a very comfortable place over the past sixty years. However, Canada’s philosophy of 
middlepowermanship is quickly vanishing. Often thought of as a ‘fat cat’ by developing nations 
(North -South Institute, 1977) Canada is now struggling to maintain its middle power status. As a 
nation, Canada likes “to look good at international conferences but without straining our economic 
relations with the major western powers… We stumble along with bits and pieces of programs with 
the various departments of government operating from totally different perspectives” (North- South 
Institute, 1977). This notion of trying to look good on the international stage, without the actions to 
support that image has become a reoccurring theme in Canadian foreign policy, severely 
undermining Canada’s middle power status.  
 
By examining middle power theory it is clear to see that Canada once fit very comfortably in the 
middle power position. However, in the 21st century using the same theory, it is clear to see that 
Canada is relying on its past record and good deeds to hold on to its middle power persona. In 
actuality, Canada is contributing less and less to international initiatives. This decline began 
decades ago, but is only now being felt by Canadians. Using typical characteristics of traditional 
middle power: peacekeeping and official development aid, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
Canada no longer can assume the same middle power position within the world order. This is only 
furthered by in-depth analysis of the relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe; that when a 
nation is facing a severe crisis the nation known as the helpful fixer is not able to help.  
 
To assess whether or not Canada remains a traditional middle power it is necessary to investigate 
themes which have often been associated with middle powers. By looking at the example of 
Zimbabwe and other aspects of traditional middle power behaviour such as peacekeeping, official 
development assistance and involvement in multilateral bodies it becomes clear that Canada’s 
position as the poster child of middlepowermanship has come to an end. The relationship that 
Canada has shared with Zimbabwe is exemplary to looking at Canada’s waning middle power 
status. It gives understanding to how the Canadian government worked tirelessly to find a middle 
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power status by getting involved in many multi- lateral initiatives through to today, where there is 
little to no involvement in Zimbabwe. 
 
1. 2 Background of the Study  
 
Canada has consistently been seen as a middle power, a helpful fixer and a nation that supports 
good governance and peacekeeping. This is a reputation that Canadians hold dear and are proud of. 
When looking at Canada’s history of middle power successes there are many events to be proud of, 
such as substantial peacekeeping contributions and a steadfast support of democracy all over the 
world spanning many decades. Upon further investigation, it has become increasingly clear that 
Canada’s reputation as middle power has been diluted and holds onto memories of the past.  
 
Since the emergence of the term middle power the world order has changed greatly. The strengths 
that propelled Canada into middle power status in the Cold War no longer exist. Throughout the 
Cold War there was a strategic importance to Canada, because of its North Atlantic geography, 
acting as the connection between Europe and the United States, and between the USSR and the 
USA, on the flight path of enemy aircrafts or missiles. But since the Cold War ended twenty years 
ago there is no longer the same importance to the landmass which separated the Soviet Union and 
the United States.  
 
Specifically, by tracing Canada’s involvement with Zimbabwe this perception becomes clear. On 
the 30th anniversary of Zimbabwe’s independence, the country which was once full of hope and 
prosperity, has fallen into a dire situation. Poverty, political violence, disease and corruption are just 
some of the widespread problems which plague this poorly managed country. The relationship 
between Canada and Zimbabwe is long but varied. At one point in time, the Canadian government 
stood up for the rights of Zimbabweans and helped bring the Commonwealth into consensus against 
the racist minority regime in Rhodesia. But now, in the 21st century, Canada is entirely insignificant 
to the Zimbabwean cause. Rather, the Canadian government has adopted the same direction as other 
western governments, enacting targeted sanctions against Robert Mugabe and the leading ZANU-
PF heavyweights, while contributing very little to alleviating the widespread crisis in Zimbabwe. 
 
1.3 Research Problem  
 
The research problem evolved out of examining Canada’s middle power status with regards to 
Zimbabwe, asking whether or not Canada can still be considered a traditional middle power? 
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Looking at the relationship shared between these two former colonies in the 20th and 21st centuries 
it has become clear that Canada can no longer be thought of as a traditional middle power in the 
global sense.  On the surface Canada does seem to fill the role of a middle power. As a nation it is 
not as large and powerful as a great power but not as small and minor as the non- great powers, and 
simply sits in the middle between the two. In true middle power character Canada has made a 
committed effort to join as many international bodies as possible showing some semblance of 
interest in many different causes.  
 
By examining the declining involvement that Canada has had in Zimbabwe despite the increasing 
severity of the crisis, it became increasingly clear that Canada has been lessening its commitments 
to international initiatives. This narrowed the focus of research to ask whether or not Canada can be 
considered a traditional middle power, using Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe as a case study.  
 
1.4 Research Methodology  
 
The research design is of a historical/ comparative nature. By using a combination of both 
qualitative and quantitative information it becomes easier to look at trends and patterns in Canadian 
middle power history. Since it is an explanatory case study most of the information used was 
retrieved from secondary sources including: journals, newspapers, books and databases. There were 
three interviews conducted to help contextualise the study and give insight to the issues being 
examined.   
 
Middle power theory plays an important role in assessing Canada’s position in the world order. 
Many different theories of middlepowermanship were studied and evaluated on their strengths and 
deficiencies. The strongest middle power theory (presented by Eduard Jordaan) was then applied to 
the case study of Canada and Zimbabwe, proving that Canada’s middle power status is declining.  
 
Using a case study adds value to the research because it allows for third party observation from 
afar; similarly, it is an example of certain behaviours and patterns. The case study of Canadian- 
Zimbabwean relations throughout the 20th and 21st centuries gives a wide range of behaviours and 
patterns which can be observed throughout an extended period of time. The downside of using a 
case study for behaviour analysis is that it is not always reliable when compared to “surveys and 
experiments” (Babbie, 1995:303).  Due to the exploratory nature of the study, both surveys and 
experiments would not be of value, as it is difficult to quantify behaviours. Using a case study to 
examine Canada’s waning middle power behaviour was the most relevant option.  
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The interviews conducted gave an unprecedented insight into the relations between Canada and 
Zimbabwe, painting a picture of what it was like to live and work in Zimbabwe over the past couple 
of decades. The interviewees were firstly selected on their knowledge and experience within 
Zimbabwe. Secondly, they were selected on their availability for an interview. All three interviews 
took place in Ottawa over one weekend in April 2010.  Two of the interviews took place in person 
while the last was done over the telephone. All three interviewees had extensive knowledge of both 
Canada and Zimbabwe.  Two of the respondents were former high commissioners to Zimbabwe 
stationed in Harare during different time periods, Charles Basset and Ann Charles. The last 
interviewee, Linda Freeman, is one of the foremost Canadian scholars on issues pertaining to 
Southern Africa; she had a particular interest and field experience in both Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. The interviewees had varied areas of expertise and interests giving insightful opinions on 
life in Zimbabwe.  The interviews added a personal element of understanding to the situation in 
Zimbabwe. It allowed for a better understanding of what day to day life entailed for Canadian 
diplomats but also a Canadian diplomat researching. Similarly, the interviewees were able to give 
first hand accounts and opinions on some of the political turmoil which has plagued the nation in 
the past decades.  
 
1.5 Limitations  
 
The choice of Zimbabwe might seem like an odd example to evaluate Canada’s waning middle 
power status. However, there are many more complexities in the relationship between the two 
countries than initially meets the eye.  Both nations shared a colonial past with conflicting 
populations within their borders. Canada acted as a voice for Zimbabweans in the Commonwealth 
trying to convince other white nations of the importance of majority rule. The evolution of 
Canada’s middle power status coincides with its relationship with Zimbabwe. Today the 
relationship between the two nations is chilly, signified by economic sanctions. 
 
The most significant limitation, which was met while undertaking the study, was the lack of 
resources available on the specific relations between Canada and Zimbabwe. Since the relationship 
between Zimbabwe and Canada has never been a major focus of Canadian foreign policy there is 
not a large amount of information available. From a historical sense it was hard to gauge where the 
two nations stood in the pre- World War Two world order. Instead of looking at the relationship 
shared between Canada and Zimbabwe throughout the entire twentieth century, we begin in the 
period after 1945. One of the drawbacks of this is that the analysis has been significantly narrowed 
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to the limited recorded events between the two nations, mostly through the lens of the 
Commonwealth. In more recent history there has been increasing interaction between the two 
nations but multi-lateral bodies continue to play an important role between the two nations. Canada 
and Zimbabwe’s relations through multilateral bodies have shaped the study in terms of time frame 
and the lens used to explain Canada’s declining middle power status.  
 
Additionally, this has made researching the specific policies between Canada and Zimbabwe 
difficult, especially since there is a plethora of information pertaining directly to the relationship 
between South Africa and Canada. Many of the facts about Canada’s relationship with southern 
Africa are based on South Africa itself and oftentimes only make little reference to Rhodesia/ 
Zimbabwe. However, by examining the general relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe as an 
illustration of Canada’s middle power decline does give a general overview of how the two nations 
interacted. By doing interviews with two former Canadian diplomats and looking at news 
publications have provided enough information to gain enough insight to analyse the relationship 
between Canada and Zimbabwe with regards to Canada’s waning middle power status. One of the 
limitations of an interview process is that the respondent will pose some form of bias. By no means 
where the three respondents experiences in Zimbabwe indicative of the overall Zimbabwean way of 
life.  
 
The focus of the case study was centred around Zimbabwe as opposed to larger multi- lateral 
bodies. Looking at larger multi-lateral bodies such as the Commonwealth and the Kimberley 
Process as an exercise of Canada’s middlepowermanship would have given a more in-depth and 
varied account of its waning middle power status. However, due to time and length constraints such 
an extensive review was not possible at this time. As a result the focal point of the study remains 
Zimbabwe and Canada’s waning involvement with the crisis-ridden nation.   
 
1.6  Overview   
 
The structure of each chapter mostly follows a chronological order, contextualizing issues in which 
the time period they arose, leading to analysis in the latter parts of each chapter. The second chapter 
provides an overview of the middle power concept, contextualises the era in which the term 
emerged, and its importance in the global world order. Different middle power perspectives, such as 
functional middle power, behavioural middle power, normative middle power and hierarchical 
middle power are presented and their strengths and weaknesses are evaluated.  The latter part of the 
chapter studies Eduard Jordaan’s middle power framework identifying the main characteristics of 
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his approach.  Lastly, the chapter looks to the future of middle power theory and the development of 
a new classification of middle power- emerging middle powers, again using Jordaan’s middle 
power analysis.   
 
The third chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section looks at Canada’s rise to 
middle power status and how the country began a love hate relationship with the term. One of the 
main themes present in this section is Canada’s involvement with multi-lateral bodies. This is a 
reoccurring theme when exploring Canada’s commitment to middlepowermanship.  Clarifying 
Canada’s middle power status from the post war era to the end of the Cold War provides the base 
needed to deconstruct the notion of Canada as a traditional middle power. This section also 
examines elements of both hard and soft power, showing how the two are necessary to maintaining 
a middle power role.  
 
The second part of the chapter discusses why Canada can no longer be considered a middle power 
and what factors have contributed to its decline. By explaining that Canada’s middle power decline 
is linked to a cooling of its economic performance while drawing attention to two elements of 
power: both hard and soft and how the two are necessary to maintain middle power status. The last 
part of the chapter examines two themes affecting Canada’s middle power status after the economic 
cool down: the military/ peacekeeping initiatives and Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
Canada’s levels of official development assistance and commitment to peacekeeping in the recent 
decades with regards to the impact of declining indicators of hard and soft power. Through these 
examples it becomes clear that Canada can no longer hold its middle power status.  
 
Chapter four gives a brief overview of Zimbabwean history and then goes on to explain the 
situation in Zimbabwe and its evolution into crisis, targeting some of the key events and themes 
which have brought it to its dire state.  The second section of the chapter provides an in-depth 
analysis of Canadian- Rhodesian/Zimbabwean relations through the twentieth century until today. 
The relationship is examined in a large part through multilateral bodies the Commonwealth, the 
United Nations, the G8 as well as multi-lateral initiatives such as the Kimberley Process. It traces 
the impact that Canadian leaders had in both the multi-lateral bodies and as individuals with regards 
to the situation in Zimbabwe. The final section of the chapter looks at current policies and the 
dwindling commitment to Africa as a whole but also Zimbabwe.  
 
The last chapter gives an overview of all the different themes discussed, drawing the conclusion 
that Canada can no longer be seen as a traditional middle power.  Zimbabwe can be seen as a test 
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case for Canadian middlepowermanship from the 1960s to the present day. By exploring some of 
the contributing factors to the crisis in Zimbabwe it becomes clear that it is a very far-reaching and 
complicated crisis. The crisis is further complicated by the lack of support from middle power 
nations such as Canada. The Zimbabwean population on a daily basis is faced with the uncertainties 
of their unstable nation. The crisis in Zimbabwe also shows the necessity not only of Canadian 
membership in multi-lateral bodies but also the necessity of working with other nations to get things 
done. By looking at the economic slowdown of the Canadian economy, which led to decreased 
spending on hard power initiatives, Canada has lost out on its soft power. The budget cuts, which 
the military has taken, have directly impacted Canada’s ability to aid in peacekeeping. The financial 
constraints of the late 20th century also negatively affected the government’s ability to send money 
abroad as development aid to countries like Zimbabwe.  Finally, the chapter ends with some 
recommendations for further research in to Canada’s declining middle power status.  
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Chapter 2: Theory and Literature Review 
 
Understanding the theory and previous literature behind the concept of middle- power is essential to 
further dissect and analyze the validity of the concept. This chapter introduces the emergence of the 
middle power theory, and then looks at the importance of middle powers to the global order. 
Afterwards, the chapter seeks to introduce various forms of middle power analysis and evaluate 
their effectiveness. Lastly, the chapter examines how middle power theory has evolved most 
recently having a wider scope and including more countries who do not fit into the category of 
small power, great power or even traditional middle power; drawing conclusions that the era post 
cold war was very similar to the post second world war two era. This chapter sets the stage to 
evaluate Canada’s role as a middle power status and ask the question whether or not Canada can 
still be considered a traditional middle power.  
 
2.1 Conceptualization: Middle Power  
 
The concept of a middle power evolved out of necessity, at a time when the world order was 
changing significantly. With the process of decolonization in the early 20th century and the 
aftermath of both World Wars, many countries were experiencing a global shift between the great 
and the non- great powers. Some nations were coming to the realization that they did not fit into 
either of the established categories very well. There were many countries which were breaking 
away from the smaller states but still had not achieved ‘great power’ status. The Cold War acted as 
an ideal platform for a new conception of power status. The emergence of middle power as a basis 
of classification needs to be understood in the context of the “transitory nature of the international 
system, caught between the erosion of the old post-1945 order and an ill- defined new order” 
(Cooper, 1997:1). After the war ended the traditional ‘great powers’ infrastructure was destroyed. 
Great Britain and the rest of Europe needed to rebuild themselves from the ground up. These former 
imperial powers found themselves in a new position economically and politically. There was a 
newfound reliance on the new world to help rebuild the world order. This is when nations such as 
Canada were able to prosper. Countries like Canada and Australia did not need to worry about 
rebuilding they focused on expanding economically, socially and structurally.  
 
A new space was created for nations who were not regionally relevant but were strong 
economically and politically.  These nations had not featured prominently on the world stage 
previous to the wars but now yearned for a stronger presence. The idea of middle powers emerged 
out of a need to classify these countries who were in-between the great and not- great powers. “A 
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middle power, in its most basic form, is a state which is neither a great power nor a small power” 
(Chapnick, 1999: 73). The most basic definition of a middle power puts those countries in a very 
unassuming place which is neither good nor bad, just sitting in the middle. It was a combination of 
capabilities coming together to define or denote the standing of a nation in the post war era 
(Keating, 2010: 5).  “The idea of a middle power did not rest on rank alone, but, and especially in 
the context of the early years of the UN, also included a combination of capabilities and 
commitment” (Keating, 2010:5).  
 
Throughout the Cold War the world was divided between two powers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, it therefore became essential to have countries that stood in the middle to try and 
mediate peace. Middle powers did not only act as a mediator between the United States and Soviet 
blocs but also within their own alliance. Yet during the cold war they were “powerlessly caught in 
the standoff between the two superpowers [which] resulted in a foreign policy highly concerned 
with military and political issues” (Jordaan, 2003:171).  
 
These new middle powers were essential to upholding the global order by emphasizing “coalition 
building and cooperation- building” (Cooper, 1997:9).  Specifically, it was the hostile Cold War 
climate which allowed for middle powers to rise to prominence. They were able to survive in part 
by “a network of international associations or regimes, in part by a system of international law, and 
in part by timely and effective diplomatic interventions by countries like Canada with an interest in 
preserving this order” (Keating, 2010:7). The Cold War made the middle powers important to the 
super-powers. For the Americans middle power nations were essential to keep NATO alive and to 
uphold its position at the top of the global order. They acted as a stabilizing force in an uncertain 
world. They did not aspire to be great powers but did pose “wide-ranging political and commercial 
interests” (Keating, 2010:6) while promoting global initiatives through international bodies. Middle 
powers sought to uphold, not disrupt, the international order. Specifically, Canada did this by 
getting involved in NATO, the UN and the Commonwealth by maintaining international lawfulness 
and promoting peacekeeping.    
 
In its basic theoretical form, middle power theory serves as a valid way to understand the changes 
in global order and how countries like Canada contributed and continue to act as stabilizers to the 
global order. Middle powers “regularly act beyond [their] legal territory, pursuing, like most nation-
states, engagements shaped by foreign policy, global institutional structures, and the more 
contingent needs of specific circumstances” (Authers, 2009:782).  By looking at the various middle 
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power theoretical frameworks its clear that middle powers especially through the Cold War were 
essential to the world order.  
 
With the end of the Cold War a need for a new reclassification has emerged once more. This brings 
the idea of “emerging” middle powers to the forefront. Similar to the post World War Two era, 
there has been a shift in the global order and a greater distinction needs to be drawn amongst 
different kinds powers, but this time the distinction needs to be drawn within the middle power 
arena. Despite many differences between traditional and emerging middle powers many theoretical 
similarities can be found. Generally speaking all middle powers have a “tendency to pursue 
multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in 
international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to 
guide diplomacy’ (Cooper et al.1993: 19). Whether the nation is perceived as a traditional middle 
power or emerging middle power these characteristics are present. By looking at various 
conceptualizations of middle powers it can be seen that Canada epitomized the traditional middle 
power persona throughout the post war era up until the end of the Cold War.  
 
2.2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework  
 
There are many different forms of middle power analysis; each theory has its strengths but also 
carries deficiencies, which often outweighs its strengths. There are five different modes of analysis 
explored and both their advantages and disadvantages are discussed. Out of the five, the mode of 
analysis presented by Eduard Jordaan offers the most far reaching and concise framework. Jordaan 
has the ability to pinpoint trends which are present throughout all middle powers and then 
distinguish between what constitutes an emerging middle power and traditional middle power. 
Jordaan has been largely inspired buy Robert Cox. He is able to identify and then differentiate 
between two types of middle powers which other models have not done.  
 
2.2.1 The Importance of Middle Powers in the Global Order:  
 
Robert Cox in his 1989 article “Middlepowermanship, Japan and the Future World Order” poses a 
valid question “what is the essence of the middle power’s functional relationship to the world 
order?” (Cox, 1989:825). Before delving into the theory behind middle powers it is important to 
understand why they are so important in the world. Middle powers have acted as a stabiliser and 
neutraliser, especially during the Cold War, middle power countries acted within the interests of 
their bloc to neutralise the tension, “or urging restraint on the alliance leader, or resisting renewed 
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tendencies towards isolationism on the part of the bloc leader”(Cooper et al. 1993:20). “The 
middle-power role is to affirm the principle of adherence to acceptable rules of conduct by all 
powers, great and small” (Cox, 1989:834). Middle powers are able to affirm this world order 
through various international institutions based on a post- Westphalian political structure and a 
decentralization of global hegemony (Cox, 1989:835).  
 
In the era after the Second World War when the Great Powers had been decimated a new grouping 
of powers began to emerge. A country like Canada who was very involved in the war through 
industry, finance, technology and manpower came out on the other side with a new place in the 
global order. No longer was Canada a former colony or a nation pretending to be its own country; 
rather, as a nation Canada had an important impact. Perhaps most importantly, the Canadian 
economy was stronger than ever at the end of the war. Since Canada was not a ‘great power’ like 
the United States or Britain but was no longer a small power a new place in the world order needed 
to be sought out. This is where the evolution of middle powers began.  
 
After the Cold War ended there were new opportunities for middle powers. They were not needed 
to try and keep a stable world order; there were new initiatives they were able to participate in. 
Since the Soviet Union and the United States were no longer caught in a constant power struggle 
and there was no longer the same divide between east and west and as a result, “middle powers had 
greater freedom of action thrust upon them in terms of their diplomacy” (Cooper et al.1993: 21). 
 
Middle powers have the ability to come together through multi-lateral bodies such as NATO and 
the UN to uphold “the norms and rules of the international system and perform certain tasks to 
maintain and strengthen that system” (Cooper et al. 1993: 21). Throughout the 1980s with the 
United States’ declining resources middle powers were poised to take on a more active role in the 
international arena (Cooper et al.1993: 21).  
 
2.2.2  Different Forms of Middle Power Analysis:  
 
Through the development of middle power theory, different forms of analysis have emerged. It is 
important to see how different scholars view middle power theory to see how the subject has 
evolved since its emergence. Chapnick (1999), Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993) and Cooper 
(1997) explore different forms of middle power: functional middle power, behavioural middle 
power, the hierarchical model and a normative lens of middlepowermanship. All theories draw on 
different information to analyse the successes of different middle powers. Each theory posses some 
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strengths and can be applied to examples of middle powers, however, their application can only be 
completed within a niche and is not widespread. Many of the different theories presented appeal to 
certain elements of middlepowermanship and fail to characterise them on a general scale without 
losing sight of their importance to the world order. Some are far too general while others have a 
narrow focus on one or two elements. This is where Eduard Jordaan’s framework gains strength. 
Jordaan is able to draw on the strengths of the various forms of middle power analysis and bring 
them together to create a unique framework.  
 
2.2.2.1 Functional Middle Power 
 
Functional middle power theory is the most widespread and perhaps easiest to understand. The 
theory is based on the desire of nations to distinguish themselves from the countries who do not 
have the same capabilities as the great powers but would like to be distinguished from those 
countries with little to no capabilities in the world order. Functional middle power status “identifies 
states which are capable of exerting influence in international affairs in specific instances, and 
differentiates them from all the rest” (Chapnick, 1999: 74). When the Second World War ended 
functional middle power theory was able to answer the call to nations such as Canada and Australia 
who wanted a better classification system of global power.  
 
Cooper (1997) argues, “functionalism is the core organizing principle in the patterned behaviour of 
the middle powers” (Cooper, 1997:4).  By using ‘functionalism’ there were benefits to the middle 
powers “symbolically, the approach provided these countries with enhanced status in the 
international system…[and] instrumentally, it offered the possibility of building up a constructive 
role in a fashion which distinguished them from the great powers” (Cooper, 1997: 5).  Countries 
were able to do this by creating a narrower focus on their international initiatives by directing “their 
attention towards the domains where they held a high degree of resources and reputational 
qualifications” (Cooper, 1997:5).  
 
“Functionalism legitimized the application to issue- specific strengths and skills possessed by 
individual countries” (Cooper, 1997:5). It allowed middle power countries with different strengths 
to rise in the world order in different capacities. Instead of trying to have an all-encompassing 
theory, functionalism allows analysis on an issue-specific area (Cooper, 1997:5).  
 
The downside of using functional middle power is that it can be “imprecise” (Chapnick, 1999:75). 
Since a state’s capacities are continually fluctuating especially with regards to certain issue areas 
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there is “no objective way to differentiate small states that might sometimes qualify for middle 
power status from those that will never qualify” (Chapnick, 1999:75). Even though functional 
middle power theory is the most widely used it does not gauge the constantly changing world order 
and therefore is not always precise in terms of analysis. Even though functional middle power 
theory is very straightforward it cannot conform to the changing capabilities of a nation, especially 
within a more narrow scope. The theory is valuable to understand on a broader platform and to gain 
a general understanding of middle power theory on the whole, however, when doing further 
investigation to middle power analysis it is not the best method.  
 
2.2.2.2 Behavioural Middle Power  
 
The behavioural middle power definition appears to be more contemporary. Instead of looking at 
the capabilities of states it looks at the actions of the middle power to classify them. The three 
elements characterize the behavioural model are: “multilateralism, conflict management and moral 
power” (Chapnick, 1999: 75). There is a greater focus on “a particular style in international 
politics” (Cooper et al.1993:19). This method has greater appeal because it is more flexible to 
accepting new middle powers and seems to fluctuate more than the definition of functional middle 
power. On the other hand, some argue that this definition might be too flexible. States are able to 
behave like a middle power without actually being one. The problem with this concept is that 
almost any state would have these features at one time or another, which renders the concept 
ineffective.  
 
 Overall, using the behavioural model makes it difficult to actually peg down a concise definition 
with examples. Behavioural middle power cannot “define middle powers objectively because its list 
of middle power behavioural characteristics is neither the same across the literature, nor tangibly 
measurable” (Chapnick, 1999: 76). Since states’ behaviour is constantly fluctuating from one issue 
to the next there is no real way to measure its middle power status though its behaviour.  Another 
problem with the behavioural model is that it cannot separate the self- interest of middle powers 
with an actual feeling of selflessness. Though behavioural lens might seem progressive, especially 
when compared to functional lens; it is too far reaching and can encompass all nations based on 
their middle power-like stance on certain issues.  
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2.2.2.3  Hierarchical Model  
 
Perhaps the most straightforward form of analysis of middle power; the hierarchical model is based 
on a middle powers position in the international order. The hierarchical model was born out of a 
need to distinguish between great and small powers. In the wake of the Second World War ‘small 
powers’ were becoming stronger and no longer fit their small roll but were not considered to be 
great powers either. The hierarchical model is based on quantifiable attributes such as “area, 
population, size, complexity and strength of economy, military capability and other comparable 
factors” (Cooper et al. 1993:17). The main problem with using the hierarchical model to distinguish 
between different powers is that it is difficult to actually quantify power (Cooper et al. 1993:17). 
Also the main attributes of the hierarchical model are continuously fluctuating constantly which 
makes it even more difficult to try and classify middle powers.  
 
2.2.2.4  Normative Middle Power 
 
Unlike the hierarchical model or functional model, normative middle power is perhaps the most 
emotionally charged theory. The normative lens puts traditional middle powers on a pedestal. 
Normative middle powers are seen as “wiser or more virtuous than the states positioned ether 
‘above’ them or ‘below’ them” (Copper et al. 1993:18). The problem with this form of analysis is 
that states can take a superior attitude when dealing with other nations, often exerting a very high 
level of self satisfaction, with often very little having been done.  
 
Another problem pointed out by Cooper et al. (1993) is that only a small number of states would be 
seen as middle powers through the normative lens; “mainly states that are like-minded’ developed 
northern states of middle size” would be considered a middle power such as Norway, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Canada (Cooper et al. 1993:18). The theory does not allow for flexibility towards 
other states who have not traditionally fallen into the middle power category such as Brazil, India or 
Nigeria. The failure of the normative lens lies in that it is unable to adapt to the changing global 
landscape and account for new trends within world order. Through the normative lens, nations 
adapt a very strong sense of self- fulfilment. This can detract from the overall global perception of a 
middle power, if a nation is too confident in itself and gives itself too much credit where it is not 
due can have negative effects on its notability.   
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2.3 Theoretical Framework: Eduard Jordaan 
 
When the concept of traditional middle power is presented a few countries immediately come to 
mind: Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and Denmark). These 
countries have many commonalities: they are generally wealthy, “stable, egalitarian, social 
democrats and not regionally influential” (Jordaan, 2003: 165). Middle powers acting as a stabiliser 
is a persistent theme in Jordaan’s analysis: “middle powers are stabilisers and legitimisers of the 
world order” (Jordaan, 2003:167). This shows the direct influence of Cox’s theories on Jordaan’s 
work.  Cox believes that:  
a middle power supports the process of international organization because of its interests in a stable 
and orderly environment, rather than to seek to impose an ideologically preconceived vision of an 
ideal world order. By implication, therefore, a middle power is one active in international 
organizations and supports the objectives of international peace and security, as one of its defined 
national interests, which leads to a more stable world order (Flemes, 2007:8-9) 
Cox and Jordaan’s ideas on the role of the middle power state within the global order are similar 
and draw on the same themes for constructing a middle power identity. Middle power behaviour on 
a global scale also plays an important role in identifying key attributes in upholding the global 
order. Middle powers are often “identified by their foreign policy behaviour, which leads to the 
identification of similarities in the constitutive features of middle-power states” (Jordaan, 
2003:166). Middle powers foreign policy is often shaped by domestic values and a feeling of social 
responsibility to help other nations in need.  
 
Jordaan emphasizes that all traditional middle powers have high standards of living and can be 
found in the upper echelons of the United Nations Development Index. Other similarities that 
traditional middle powers share is that they have well established democracies, are the core of the 
world economy and have a propensity for conflict reduction (Jordaan, 2003). Similarly, traditional 
middle powers emerged in the wake of the Second World War; rising to prominence while Eastern 
Europe was rebuilding itself.  
 
Despite being located in very different places geographically the traditional middle powers share 
many similar characteristics. It is widely acknowledged that traditional middle powers do not carry 
much regional influence and that they are constantly struggling to exert themselves regionally. By 
themselves, traditional middle powers do not exert great influence generally they have “weak and 
ambivalent regional orientation, [and work to construct] identities distinct from powerful states in 
their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform” (Jordaan, 2003: 165). 
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Take, for example, Canada in comparison to the United States or Norway in comparison to the EU. 
Both yield very little power regionally but have made a strong name for themselves internationally 
despite relatively small populations.  
 
Middle power foreign policy is characterised by a desire to act as a stabiliser to the world order. By 
aligning themselves with like-minded states on issues though multi-lateral bodies middle powers 
can find resolutions to global issues. Their solution is to seek “multilateral solutions to international 
problems, for advocating compromise and for, in general, being part of the solution to problems at 
international level”(Jordaan, 2003: 166). Multilateral bodies such as NATO and the United Nations 
are essential for middle powers’ survival in the global order. Through multilateral bodies middle 
powers are able to act on international issues which might not directly pertain to them. The 
arguments that Jordaan presents seem to fall into the trend of how other scholars view middle 
powers that middle powers “usually support multilateralism, and make alliance with other middle 
powers to give their voices some weight, where often only the powerful matter” (Hynek & Bosold, 
2010: 142). By joining these larger bodies middle powers are upholding the hegemonic order by 
stabilising and perpetuating the already established order.  
 
Foreign aid is as important as multilateral behaviour. By giving out official development assistance 
(ODA) middle powers are able to project a form of influence outside of their own borders whilst 
helping out another state. Traditional middle power foreign aid “is a transposition of domestic 
approaches to economic justice and equality to the international sphere” (Jordaan, 2003: 174). ODA 
is a way to transpose influence from a regionally unimportant nation on a global scale to elevate its 
global standing.  
 
Lastly, Jordaan explains that “during the initial appearance of states appearance as middle powers, 
the role performed by national leaders seems disproportionately important compared with later in 
the lifespan of middle powers” (Jordaan, 2003:175). This is a trend which can be seen with many 
traditional middle powers from Lester B. Pearson in Canada to Olaf Palme in Sweden, the leaders 
in the post war era were integral to carving out a middle position for their small states and often it is 
the personality which dominated the political scene.  
 
The strength of Jordaan’s article lies in its wide range, dissecting many trends to apply to the 
traditional middle powers. He shows both the positive and negative aspects of the title ‘traditional 
middle power.’ Jordaan outlines a broad reaching but valid theory on middle powers. He is able to 
link middle powers though themes which have not been widely explored. He notes that attitudes 
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towards regionalism, democratic stability, leadership, foreign policy, membership to multi-lateral 
bodies, foreign aid and identity are key factors to examining the middle power state.  The middle 
power role in the world order is to act as a stabiliser and to perpetuate the established world order. 
Middle power states have done this through the themes outlined in his article.  
 
2.4 The Future of Middle Power: Emerging Middle Powers 
  
The term ‘middle power’ is constantly changing and “should not be evaluated as ‘a fixed universal’ 
but as ‘something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the 
international system’” (Cox, 1989b). In recent past there has been a growing distinction between 
different types of middle powers- traditional and emerging. Similar to the end of the Second World 
War, the end of the Cold War presented a new opportunity of classification for many countries. 
Much like traditional middle powers, emerging middle powers are seeking to carve out a position 
for themselves in the ever-changing world order.  The term ‘middle power’ is ambiguous with no 
concrete definition; therefore it is important to create a distinction between ‘traditional middle 
power’ and ‘emerging middle power.’ By doing this it allows for a broader range of countries to be 
recognized for their varying capacities.   
 
As the world has evolved and states assume new places in the world, old terms such as ‘middle 
power’ need to be adjusted and adapted to include states who are neither great powers nor small 
powers but do not fit the characterisations of being a traditional middle power. The idea of an 
‘emerging middle power’ has become useful when trying to define countries like South Africa, 
Brazil or India. These countries have moved into a more prominent position from the periphery and 
much like traditional middle powers in the post war era, they found themselves at odds with the 
current categories of classification. Emerging middle powers have been on the rise since the end of 
the Cold War.  Since the end of the Cold War there has been a global movement towards social and 
economic issues as opposed to a focus on the military. This “has created a favourable environment 
for semi- peripheral states seeking to raise issues of global economic equality and justice” (Jordaan, 
2003: 178). Often times, emerging middle powers act as the voice representing other disadvantaged 
countries on global issues (such as poverty). States like Brazil and India now had the ability to 
carve out their own niche similar to Canada and Australia in the post Second World War era.  
 
Traditional middle powers are noted for their contributions on the international scale, emerging 
middle powers are “first of all, regional powers and in addition middle powers (with regard to their 
power resources) on a global scale” (Nolte, 2007:10). This is in stark contrast to traditional middle 
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powers. Emerging middle powers or “the new global ‘middle’—is already giving rise to the 
reordering of actual global relations and highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices of 
global governance” (Shaw et al. 2009:29). This rings true especially in Africa,  
in terms of ecologies, economies (informal and formal, illegal and legitimate), societies and 
states—as well as a global context, with active diaspora communities in Europe and North 
America. The new global middle appears to be acting as a ring of magnets, attracting migrants 
from failed or fragile states, and in turn resulting in growing remittances (Shaw et al. 2009:30) 
This gives greater significance to the emerging middle powers, for their attractiveness to 
immigrants and the shifting patterns of migration. With migration patterns changing a new focus on 
the emerging middle powers appears but there is also a change the regional economic structure.  
 
In almost all ways emerging middle powers differ from traditional middle powers, but still yield 
power internationally. Emerging middle powers are “usually semi- peripheral, materially 
inegalitarian and recent democratic states which exercise great regional power and self- association” 
(Jordaan, 2003: 165).  Unlike traditional middle powers, emerging middle powers thrive on their 
regional strength. They lean towards regional integration through trade agreements and multi-lateral 
bodies; such as South Africa and SADC or Nigeria and ECOWAS. Emerging middle powers  “are 
keen participants and often initiators of regional integration and cooperation” (Jordaan, 2003: 172). 
However, outside of their immediate region they tend to be less influential. Emerging middle 
powers like South Africa prided themselves on being a regional voice on global issues and drawing 
attention to regional issues on the world stage.  
 
Emerging middle powers are characteristically only recently democratised. They are in the process 
of transitioning to a fully democratic system. This adds a certain aspect of instability to the new 
democracy in the state, which is in contrast to traditional middle powers.  “Democracy in some 
emerging middle powers often seems of a poorer quality than found in traditional middle powers, 
considering, for example, commonplace human rights abuses in Nigeria, Malaysia and Turkey and 
one-party domination in countries like South Africa and Malaysia” (Jordaan, 2003:171).  
 
Another unique characteristic of emerging middle powers is that they possess a very skewed 
distribution of wealth. Countries who fall into the classification as emerging middle powers have 
the largest gaps between rich and poor on a global level (Jordaan, 2003:172), such as in South 
Africa which is home to some of the greatest dichotomies between rich and poor. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
Tracing the development of traditional middle powers gives insight into the importance of the world 
order. It shows how relatively ‘neutral’ nations are integral to maintain the peace and mediate 
through crises. As the global order is constantly shifting it is important to be able to classify 
emerging middle powers in the same manner as traditional middle powers like Canada, Australia 
and Sweden. As in 1945, the world is recognising the distinct differences between the not great and 
the great countries but perhaps on a more specific scale. New and more accepting categories are 
developing to keep up with the constant change in the world order. Some of the frameworks 
discussed cannot keep up with the shifting global landscape. The hierarchical model is dated and is 
based on an out of date way of quantifying power based on population and military capabilities. On 
the opposite end of the spectrum, the behavioural model is too flexible and can classify some states 
as middle powers when they only act like a middle power, but are not necessarily a middle power 
through and through.  
 
After examining the various types of middle power analysis it is clear that Jordaan presents the best 
framework. Inspired by Cox and Gramsci, Jordaan highlights characteristics essential to both 
emerging and traditional middle powers while applying them to relevant examples. Furthermore, 
Jordaan has also created a strong distinction between emerging and traditional middle powers, 
showing how the theory is flexible and can keep up with the shifting global order.  
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Chapter Three: If Canada Speaks and No One Listens, Does it Make a Sound?  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Tracing Canada’s emergence as a middle power in the post World War Two era through to today 
shows how Canadian middle power status has shifted greatly. By examining the characteristics and 
the process in which Canada attained the middle power role makes it much easier to analyse 
whether or not Canada can still be considered a traditional middle power in the 21st century. 
Historically speaking, Canada has been seen as the prime example when analysing middle power 
status.  In the past Canada has been renowned for its commitment to peacekeeping and giving 
foreign aid. Pierre Pettigrew, a former minister of foreign affairs, has argued that “Canadian foreign 
policy is ‘an outward expression of our society’ a manifestation – through a slippery conceptual 
intersection between ideas of the individual, the national, and the international – of the personal 
desires of those Canadians who, ‘more than ever, want to make a difference globally’” (Authers, 
2009: 783). For a long time the term ‘middle power’ proved to be an acceptable term to describe 
Canada’s position in the world. For decades now politicians and scholars alike have been arguing 
whether or not this is an appropriate term to describe Canada. From Pearson to Harper, Prime 
Ministers have tried to prove that Canada is a middle power or not a middle power. Former Prime 
Minister Paul Martin thought that the idea of Canada being a middle power “imposes an 
unnecessary ceiling on what we can do and be in the world” (Martin, 2005). Despite various Prime 
Ministers’ sensitivity on the classification of Canada as a middle power it “has played a useful 
function in locating Canadian foreign policy in the harsh environment of global politics” (Keating, 
2010:3). 
 
The Canadian economy felt strong growth after the Second World War but by the 1970s the 
economy was cooling and the same level of growth was not felt again. There are a few contributing 
factors to this which are examined, the effects of the economic slow down had effects on many 
facets of Canadian policy making. The second element undermining Canada’s middle power status 
is the country’s involvement in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping has been controversial over the past 
decades. Canada once the strongest peacekeeping nation in the world has fallen behind and its 
peacekeeping efforts have been tainted by two major scandals in the 1990s. Lastly, Canada’s ODA 
can be seen as a contributing factor to the decline of middle power status. There has been less 
money going towards ODA especially compared with other middle power nations (Norway and 
Sweden). These three factors are a clear indication of Canada’s waning middle power status.   
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Regardless of the current opinions on Canada’s role in the world, it is clear that in the past, they 
described a traditional middle power. Canadian foreign policy has followed a pattern of  “Canadian 
values, including a belief in peace, order, and good government, human rights, and a diverse 
society, [and] are said to not only prompt international engagement, but also to determine its form” 
(Authers, 2009:792). The attitude and the desire to uphold Canadian values since the end of the 
Second World War has helped create a unique position on the world stage. Canada’s middle power 
status has been used to create a voice in multilateral organizations, “leadership in international 
initiatives, and consultation within Canadian officials on matters of concern to the international 
community. Canada has used the middle power concept to further its foreign policy aims and to 
promote nationalism through an internationally recognized identity” (Chapnick, 2000:188). 
However true, this is characteristic of decades past, Canada no longer holds the same middle power 
position as it once did.  
 
This chapter begins with looking at some of the characteristics of middle power status outlined by 
Jordaan and to Canada: foreign policy, leadership and identity. This is followed by an in-depth 
examination of characteristics which are now seen as disproving the scholarship upholding 
Canada’s middle power status. The three main elements examined are, the economy, military and 
peacekeeping, and lastly, ODA. These are three elements essential to upholding middle power 
status and they have been in steady decline in recent decades. They also draw on elements of both 
hard and soft power which is essential to maintaining a middle ground.  
 
3.2 Canada’s emergence as a traditional middle power: Largest of the Small Powers or 
Smallest of the Large Powers?  
 
Characteristically, like many other traditional middle powers, Canada’s rise to middle power status 
occurred after the Second World War. The evolution from colony to middle power began during the 
First World War. The manpower that Canada sent to help the Allied powers was significant. After 
the war ended, the Canadian government felt it best to join the League of Nations as a separate 
nation from Great Britain. This started the separation between Canada and Great Britain on the 
international stage. However, during the interwar years Canada accepted its position as a ‘non- 
great power.’ Other monumental actions in the interwar period for Canada included “the ability to 
send Canadian diplomatic representatives abroad, and the ability to sign its own international 
treaties” (Nossal et al. 2011: 51). Canada’s diplomatic autonomy was finally granted through the 
Statute of Westminster in 1931. At first, during the 1930s, Canada used its autonomy to reinforce its 
position within the British Commonwealth, while ducking or avoiding as far as possible any kind of 
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prominent role in the League of Nations or other international fora. As Nossal suggests, Canadian 
leaders “accepted the division of the international system into a simple dichotomous hierarchy” 
(Nossal, 1997:53).  
 
One of the greatest turning points for Canadian symbolic independence was with the onset of the 
Second World War. When Britain went into the war the Canadian government did not automatically 
join but waited one week before declaring war on Germany. Similar to the First World War, Canada 
contributed substantial manpower to the war relative to the small Canadian population (1.1 million 
people, about 10% of the then population). More importantly, Canada developed economically 
during the war, becoming the third industrial power on the Allied side – granted, far behind the 
Americans and the British. No longer was the government concerned with recognition as a separate 
state, “rather, Ottawa wanted the great powers to recognize its war effort- a sizeable one for a state 
with a small population and limited resources” (Nossal, 1997:54). 
 
Canada began to feel increasingly aware of the growing differences between the great and non- 
great powers. As a country, Canada knew it was not a great power but felt a growing difference 
with other smaller nations. The non- great powers had very different capacities and the Canadian 
government felt that these differences should be recognized. During the war, the British and 
Americans found the emergence of such powers to be a nuisance: claims to a new status could wait 
until after the war. 
 
It was not only Canadian politicians who were starting to take note of the shift in power. In 1943 
The Economist drew an interesting parallel trying to classify Canada’s position on the world stage. 
They wrote: 
If Canada is prevented by the smallness of her population from taking rank with the Great 
powers, she has in the last three years made a category for herself all of her own. Relative to 
her resources her effort is second to none. In absolute terms the distance which separates 
Canada from the Great Powers is less than that between her own achievements and that of any 
other of the small powers (The Economist, 1943 in as cited in Chapnick, 2000:192) 
  
When the Second World War ended Canada was still trying to navigate a new global position, one 
which was entirely separate from its British mother. Canada’s integral role in the war was not going 
unnoticed, but it became difficult to find a proper place in the world order for this post-colonial 
nation. Canada was not alone with these sentiments: Australia was also seeking a new position in 
the post war global order. Cooper calls Australia and Canada “the first followers of the post-1945 
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international order” (Cooper et al. 1997:27), playing integral roles in building new institutions and 
“strengthening development in the South” (Cooper et al. 1997: 27).  
 
It was not until 1945 that the term “middle power” was slowly introduced into the Canadian 
government’s vocabulary. The increasing use of the term developed through a growing disdain for 
the simplistic division between ‘great’ and ‘non-great’ powers (Nossal et al. 2011: 53). Initially the 
term ‘middle power’ was begrudgingly used “with the prefix ‘so-called” by Canadian 
parliamentarians (Nossal et al. 2011: 53). This signalled the beginning of the love- hate relationship 
with the term.  
 
With the onset of the Cold War Canada began to play a new strategic role in world politics. It is 
“sandwiched” between the United States and the Soviet Union and became an important land mass 
(Nossal et al.2011: 27). With the United States as next door neighbour Canada strengthened its 
military to help protect the continent, but only up to a point. In Nossal’s opinion for Canada “it was 
as much (if not more) a question of sovereignty rather than security” (Nossal et al. 2011: 28). The 
government wanted to move in a direction of mediation and peacebuilding as opposed to traditional 
‘hard power’ through the military.  
 
Canada throughout the Cold War did not mediate between the great powers but rather, within the 
western bloc (Nossal et al. 2011: 55). Two examples of this are: is its role in the Suez Crisis in 1956 
and then its role in the Commonwealth over the Rhodesian question. The Canadian government was 
very concerned with smaller more contained conflicts. The government was “keen to help reinforce 
international mechanism for conflict management- particularly those associated with the United 
Nations. As a result, Canada became a strong supporter of international peacekeeping and truce 
supervision” (Nossal et al. 2011:56). This signalled Canada’s shift towards peace building and 
conflict resolution, which would help solidify its role as a middle power in the world order.  
 
3.3  Upholding the Middle Power Reputation 
 
The post- war era was ideal for Canada to make a name for itself externally as a middle power. It 
has acted as legitimiser, peacekeeper, proponent of conflict reduction and supporter of multilateral 
solutions with like-minded states. From the outset there are some elements of middle powermanship 
which are more obvious than others. Jordaan presents many attributes necessary for a nation to be 
considered a middle power. Some of these characteristics are easily applied when examining 
Canada’s middle power status of the past including: regional significance, identity, foreign policy 
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participation in multi-lateral bodies and leadership. Since Canada has an “inability… to unilaterally 
and single handily shape global outcomes in any direct manner” it is essential for them to 
participate in multi-lateral bodies and have a strong foreign policy (Jordaan, 2003:169). As a result, 
Canada has acted as a legitimising force to the current world order upholding the middle power 
reputation.  
 
3.3.1 Regional Significance  
 
Canada is a middle power but not a regional power, fitting with Jordaan’s framework. Next door to 
the United States, Canada is regionally insignificant. Canada cannot measure up financially or 
militarily and is largely dependent on the American economy. With the signing of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 Canada became even more dependent on the 
United States (Welsh, 2004). Until recently, more than 80% of Canada’s exports went to the United 
States, which is thought to have changed the traditional “east- west trading axis to a north-south 
trading axis” (Welsh, 2004: 590). Canada has become accustomed to a comfortable position without 
having to think about the issue of security. Brysk (2009) characterizes Canada’s position as one of a 
“protected middle power, freed of the security dilemma by U.S. hegemony- at the price of perpetual 
junior partnership in an involuntary alliance” (Brysk, 2009:84). Regionally, Canada carries little 
clout and often needs to fall in line with the neighbour to the south. This is in keeping with the 
traditional middle power characteristic set out by Jordaan.  
 
3.3.2 Canadian Identity?  
 
The idea of national identity (or lack thereof) is a very sore spot for many Canadians. Due to the 
lack of regional significance Canada has constantly been struggling to create an identity solely its 
own. Since traditional middle powers are not regionally significant they try very hard to create a 
unique identity different from the super powers. Canadians dwell on any aspect of how they are 
different than Americans and try to base their national identity on how they are dissimilar to 
Americans. Henry Kissinger is quoted saying: “We are so big, whatever identity they have, they get 
in opposition to us” (Bothwell, 2007:314). On top of the insecurity due to the more significant 
neighbour to the south, there are many other internal factors which take away from a unified 
Canadian identity. A 2005 article by Robert Cox titled “A Canadian Dilemma: the United States or 
the World” describes Canada’s current position as struggling against being part of the functional 
empire (Cox, 2005: 684).   
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The strength of Cox’s argument lies in the idea that Canadians are “free to be different” 
highlighting the unique position that middle powers posses. Since Canada is struggling to find an 
identity solely its own it “wants to immerse itself in all parts of the world and be part of the 
experience of the world's developing diversity” (Cox, 2005: 684). Historical factors contribute to 
this multicultural identity. Since the first Europeans came to Canada over five hundred years ago 
there has been a mix of English, French and First Nations influence coming together to create a 
distinct identity. Unfortunately, the coming together has not been harmonious and has been 
controversial since the beginning.  In recent history, Canada has become a “microcosm of the whole 
world” with people immigrating from all over the world (Cox, 2005:679). This has added to 
confusions Canadians have about their own identity, not knowing what being Canadian actually 
means.  
 
Canadians relish the multicultural comparison between the United States; the cultural mosaic versus 
the melting pot. American immigration is often characterized by the ‘American Dream’ and the 
attempt to fulfil “common expectations, aspirations, and behavioural norms” (Cox, 2005: 679). As 
opposed to Canada where “new immigrant groups have been more likely to retain their cultural 
identity to become part of a larger society that has been described as a ‘community of 
communities’” (Cox, 2005: 679). In an attempt to further distinguish themselves from the 
Americans, Canadians embrace their “community of communities” and have accepted an “ethos of 
multiculturalism” as an essential part of the Canadian identity (Cox, 2005: 679). Taking all of these 
unique identities and feelings of inadequacy compared to the United States it is clear why 
Canadians find it so difficult to have their own unique identity to uphold its middle power image. 
 
3.3.3 Canada and the World 
 
Foreign policy is a nation’s tool to interact with the rest of the world and Canadian foreign policy is 
no different. For a middle power foreign policy is extremely important as a means to convey its 
values to the rest of the world. Currently, Canada maintains 270 missions in 180 countries (Cohen, 
2003:16). This is a tool to keep lines of communication open with the rest of the world and to 
maintain some form of prominence.   
  
One element of foreign policy that Canadians view as extremely important is foreign aid or ODA. 
By projecting an image of giving ‘generously’  (actually about .3 % of the GDP, Graph 3) 
Canadians view themselves as “good international citizens” and it offers “domestic approaches to 
economic justice and equality to the international sphere” (Jordaan, 2003:174). As part of Canadian 
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foreign policy the government uses the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to 
conceive and then administer its ODA. In 2003 Canada spent $2.4 billion on aid (Cohen, 2003:18). 
In 2005 Canadian foreign policy outlined three themes consistent with middle powers: “the 
promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security within a stable global 
framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture” (Hillmer & Granatstein, 2007:6). As 
Jordaan (2003:166) outlines, middle powers (like Canada), main tenant of foreign policy is its 
“proclivity for seeking multi-lateral solutions to international problems, for advocating compromise 
and for, in general being part of the solution at the international level.” Meaning they rely on their 
foreign policy and membership to multi-lateral organizations to contribute to the world order and 
maintain their middle power status.  
 
 “No one belongs to more clubs” (Cohen, 2003:15). A bold statement, and one that rings true for 
Canada. Being a member of a plethora of multilateral bodies is something the Canadian government 
is strongly in support of as a middle power. Many of the “clubs” Canada is a member of it was also 
a founding partner, such as the G20 and UN. Canada takes pride in belonging to the larger multi 
lateral bodies such as the UN, NATO, IMF and OAS but also in smaller (perhaps dated) bodies of 
both the Commonwealth and la Francophonie. By being a member of so many bodies Canada is 
able to voice an opinion and have influence on a variety of different issues which do not directly 
affect them. This is consistent with maintaining the current world order and perpetuating their 
middle power status.   
 
3.3.4 Leaders  
 
Canada’s rise to become a middle power can be attributed to the influential role many of its leaders 
played in building up the position. Though Canada’s ascent to middle power status began well 
before Lester B. Pearson’s time, he is looked upon as setting the benchmark for Canadian foreign 
policy. He worked tirelessly to help advance Canada’s position as a separate entity from Britain. 
Once Canada was ensured of its own place internationally, Pearson moved his sights to trying to 
make the world a more peaceful place, and in doing so he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Pearson’s 
impact was so great that “no prime minister since has failed to evoke his legacy or tried to escape 
his shadow” (Cohen, 2003:3). Directly through his efforts he helped create the “architecture of the 
post- war era [and] how our benefactors laid the foundation of the world’s first aid program” 
(Cohen, 2003:3).  
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Having one very influential leader help bring a nation into middle power status at the outset is 
characteristic of many emerging and traditional middle powers. There is a president or prime 
minister who “during the initial appearance of states as middle powers, the role performed by 
national leaders seems disproportionally important compared with later in the lifespan of middle 
powers” (Jordaan, 2003:175). It has been suggested that Pearson, and to a lesser extent, two of his 
colleagues, Hume Wrong (the Canadian ambassador to the United States) and Norman Robertson 
(high commissioner to Great Britain and clerk of the Privy Council) gave “shape to a restless nation 
shedding its colonial past and pursuing an independent role in the world” (Cohen, 2003:7). This is 
one of the few-shared characteristics between emerging and traditional middle powers.   
 
Presently, the current government actively supports Canada’s middle power status which has been 
developed over the years. Prime Minister Stephen Harper believes that middle powers “step up to 
the plate to do their part…[are] willing to assume responsibilities, seek practical, doable solutions to 
problems and who have a voice and influence in global affairs because they lead, not by lecturing 
but by example” (Nossal et al. 2011: 60). In an echo of Canada’s past economic prominence, 
Harper has also expressed his desire for Canada to become an energy super-power. He expects 
Canada’s petroleum, uranium and waterpower potential to enhance Canada’s position in the world. 
Thus far this has not been successful. Alberta’s oil producing tar sands have caused controversy 
globally, being the subject of an environmental outcry. The current government’s attempts to try 
and further Canada’s position within the global order are at best ambiguous in its effect.  
 
3.4  Canada’s Decline From Middle Power Status  
Canada’s identity as a Middle Power is outdated and uninspiring to a growing number of Canadians. 
The concept fails to reflect how Canadians have evolved while the global hierarchy upon which it is 
premised has eroded. To be effective on the international stage Canada needs an identity that speaks 
to these important changes (Canada 25, 2004).  
 
Since the middle power concept has become so integrated into political and academic vocabulary 
the government has become self-conscious about being pigeon holed into a distinct category. Even 
though the definition of ‘middle power’ is not set in stone many scholars have begun to question the 
categorization and whether or not it is an appropriate classification of power.  Canada’s role as a 
middle power has been in decline for three major reasons. Most obviously, other economies have 
grown faster than Canada’s. In response to a slower growth rate, Canadian governments have reined 
in both military expenditures and ODA, Canada thus has a smaller presence in the world, both 
absolutely and proportionately. 
  
38
 
 
 The question is therefore asked; is Canada is upholding the middle power status it worked so hard 
to create? Canadians still see their country as a “mediator, a peacekeeper, a driving force for the 
attempt to expand the realm of democracy and the rule of law, of individual rights and freedom, of 
peace, order and good government and also of sustainable economic well being” (von Bredow, 
2009:169). These different themes have developed into a Canadian middle power identity 
correlating with the main themes of middlepowermanship. As outlined by Jordaan (2003), the 
promotion of Canadian values abroad is thought of as essential to maintaining middle power status. 
Being a mediator and orchestrating peace are essential to fill the role of being a middle power, but 
within the past twenty to thirty years these roles have become largely a memory. The current 
government rests on the reputation Canada gained decades ago.  
 
3.4.1  Economy  
 
The end of the Second World War was important to Canada for a number of reasons. Politically, it 
made Canada a pillar upholding world order. In economic terms it allowed Canada to expand its 
markets while the traditional economic centres in Europe were rebuilding from the ground up. 
Increasing economic integration with the United States enhanced prosperity. In the 1950s, when 
compared to the rest of the world, Canada’s standard of living was second in the world “behind the 
Americans, but far ahead of anybody else- including the British” (Bothwell, 2007:107).  This 
economic boom that Canadians enjoyed in the post-war period launched Canada into many 
economic initiatives, from jet engines to atomic reactors. The strength of Canada’s economy was 
another indicator that it had reached middle power status.  
It is a truism that an independent nation, Canada has never “been wholly self- sufficient” (Nossal, 
1997:29) relying on other nations to bolster its economy. The reliance on trade for Canada’s GDP 
has been a continual theme throughout Canadian political history. Some have even argued that 
Canadian “foreign policy is trade policy” (MacLaren, 1997:30). Accordingly Canada is extremely 
sensitive to the American market and “virtually all foreign policy issues become linked to 
Canadian- American relations” (Nossal, 1997:33). 
 
Canada’s fruitful economy meant it could afford to belong to many international bodies, and could 
offer generous foreign assistance. Many Canadians believed that “development assistance could 
help lay the foundations for steady economic growth by promotion of the commercialization of 
agriculture, boosting domestic consumption, and raising the level of savings and capital 
investment” (Tomlin et al. 2008:157). Initially, development aid was seen as a wise investment 
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which would be profitable for the Canadian economy, in terms of promoting Canadian goods and 
services abroad. Under Pearson there was an immediate shift in the character of the government’s 
development policy. As opposed to infrastructure and agricultural development there was 
movement towards social investment such as education and healthcare. When Trudeau became 
prime minister the policy was focused on the poorest countries, but pressure was mounting on the 
development policy to focus on economic developments which would have a greater impact on the 
Canadian economy. 
 
The Conservative Mulroney government shifted its aid policy towards one of direct domestic 
economic benefits. As a result, the government’s priorities moved “in the direction of supporting 
Canadian trade and investment abroad by channelling development assistance to those middle-
income, developing countries where economic fortunes were rising” (Tomlin et al. 2008: 159), as 
opposed to the least developed countries.  
 
While the Canadian economy continued to grow and the Canadian standard of living continued to 
rise until the early 1970s, Europe and Japan had rebuilt their economies which were, inevitably, 
larger than Canada’s. Domestically, the Canadian government redirected some of its resources, on, 
for example, universal health care and a comprehensive pension system. As a result of the change in 
government policy, the budget had to be adjusted to accommodate the expenses of healthcare so 
there was simply less money to be sent abroad. Despite the increased spending on healthcare in the 
budget, the first five years after medicare was introduced the Canadian budget was in surplus. The 
1970s brought economic slowdown for many nations, including Canada. What was happening at the 
time was a combination of stagflation and national revenues reaching a plateau. All of these factors 
contributed to Canada’s lessening ability to maintain the same level of commitment and to the 
decline in its middle power ranking.  
 
The Mulroney era of the 1980s was characterised by economic belt-tightening. Nevertheless by the 
end of Mulroney’s term the deficit had grown substantially. The end of the Cold War brought more 
changes in foreign policy, in part because the great enemy of forty years was no longer there, but 
also because the end of the Cold War coincided with a sharp recession and a debt crisis in 
government finance. When Mulroney left office in 1993, there was a significantly greater deficit 
than when he came into office in 1983. The newly elected Liberal government needed to deal with 
not only the growing deficit but the interest it accumulated. “An aggressive approach to deficit 
reduction throughout much of the 1990s effectively decimated government resources devoted to 
international activity” (Keating, 2010: 4). This also had a great impact on Canadian military 
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spending. On the whole, the idea of spending less on the military pleased the Canadian population, 
but most Canadians did not realise that the cutbacks in military spending would have consequences 
for Canada’s role as a middle power, especially in terms of peacekeeping. 
 
3.4.2 Global Economic Bodies and Canada’s Decline as a Middle Power   
 
The economic slow-down of the Canadian economy also affected Canada’s participation in multi-
lateral bodies. Being a member of multi-lateral organizations is an integral part of being considered 
a middle power.  Canada is a member of many organizations, which require both attention and 
money. More to the point, membership does not necessarily mean importance or significance. 
When Canada joined the G7 in 1976, the Canadian economy really was the world’s sixth largest, 
ahead of Italy. By the 1990s this was no longer the case. Wisely, the Canadian government 
redefined its foreign policy goals from the G7 to the G20, where Canada could still legitimately 
claim a place. This initiative was particularly identified with Paul Martin, finance minister in the 
1990s and prime minister from 2003 to 2006. 
  
The G20 incorporates emerging economies such as India, China, Brazil and South Africa.1 These 
emerging economies, especially China and India have gained increasing importance to the global 
economy while Canada’s role has been lessening. The motivation behind the creation of the G20 
was obvious. Canada was no longer the sixth, seventh or even eighth wealthiest economy in world 
terms. It was only a matter of time until Canada’s position in the G8 was questioned, and former 
prime minister Paul Martin tried to avoid the question by redefining the terms of the meeting and 
incorporating these emerging economies.  
 
Today, the G8 still meets and coexists with the G20 but is now seen as an elitist enterprise which 
fails to incorporate the shift in the global order.  The G8s influence has been lessening with fewer 
programs actually materializing. The stagnation of global initiatives like the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD, discussed in Chapter 4) which was introduced at the G8 summit in 
2002, can be seen as an example of the declining political and economic influence of not only the 
G8 but Canada’s influence within the body. NEPAD is an initiative aimed at the improvement of 
many elements of African society based substantially on support from G8 members. Since its 
inception it has fallen short of its target goals.   
                                                 
1 The G20 was started in 1999 and is comprised of: South Africa, Canada, Mexico, United States, Argentina, 
Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, the European Union, 
France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Australia.  
  
41
 
 
 
Current Prime Minister Stephen Harper is the acting President of the G8 for 2010. Canada, most 
recently hosted both the G8 and G20 summits in Toronto and despite best efforts it turned out to be 
a disastrous meeting. The total cost was about 1 billion dollars, spent on security, lavish 
accommodations and marketing Canada to the world. In the end what made global headlines was 
not the content of the summits but rather the protests, the price tag and riots in Toronto.  
 
By holding a worldwide economic conference Canada attempted to uphold its middle power status. 
But spending 1-billion dollars on the conference enraged the population and created a larger chasm 
between the government and its electorate. Having such a large international conference with an 
immense price tag where very little was accomplished did not place Canada in a good light to the 
rest of the world. At the same time, Canada’s Conservative government found itself at odds with the 
summit’s most important member, the United States. Returning to Washington, American delegates 
expressed disgust with the summit and the summit process (Private Communication, 2010 citing 
Strobe Talbott).  
American president Barak Obama said that he did “not like the form or the substance of the G8 and 
G20 meetings. Indeed, he left convinced that bilateral and other group meetings were more useful” 
(English, 2010). The focus of the Summit was economic, centred on job creation, financial growth 
and stability. The Millennium Development Goals were discussed in brief, but were not a central 
focus of the event.  The issue of Maternal Health was something that Stephen Harper pushed for 
and was met with substantial controversy. The Maternal Health strategy “strives for care before and 
after birth, family planning including contraception, reproductive health, treatment and prevention 
of diseases, prevention of mother-to-child transmission of disease, immunization and nutrition” 
(CBC, 2010). Despite the government’s best intentions, the Maternal Health initiative turned into a 
very public debate over the right to abortion instead of the actual policy aimed to helping new 
mothers and children. In the end, it was the gross overspending and the controversy around the 
Toronto summit undermined its actual purpose. The Canadian government was extremely 
misguided in the organization and spending towards the G8/20 summits which has further 
weakened its middle power stance. Today, the legacy left behind in the wake of the summits is 
discontent and mismanagement- not the subjects discussed.  
 
The Canadian economy was once the “second highest income in the world after the Second World 
War [but] now has the twelfth-largest economy and seventh-highest per capita income” (Cohen, 
2003: 26). Throughout the post-war era Canada experienced unprecedented economic growth. 
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Unlike its European counterparts, Canada did not need to rebuild itself from the ground up giving it 
an economic advantage. It was only a matter of time before the gap between Europe and Canada 
closed. One of Jordaan’s crucial characteristics of middle power status was a stable economy. 
Canada through the past decades has shown a substantial economic slow down and the strength of 
its economy is being confronted by some new challengers- the emerging middle powers. The 
emerging nations of China and India are growing exponentially in terms of economic growth which 
pushes Canada further down the list of economic bigwigs in the world order.  
 
3.4.3 Decline of Hard Power, Leading to the Decline of Soft Power  
 
The concepts of both hard and soft power are integral to examining Canada’s declining status as a 
middle power. Nye (1990) points out that it is necessary for a country to posses both hard and soft 
power for it to maintain relevancy in the world.  He gives the example of the United States having 
the most hard power but also “has the soft ideological resources to preserve its lead in the new 
domains of transnational interdependence” (Nye, 1990:171). In the past decades Canada has moved 
towards a soft power ideal, by doing so they have moved away from the basic tenants of hard power 
adding to its middle power decline.  
 
Middle power status and soft power are complementary concepts. Middle powers engage in ‘soft 
power’ activities such as joining multilateral bodies, peace initiatives while trying to disassociate 
themselves from hard power activities. This concept is something Canadians appreciated in the 
1990s and the 2000s. Unfortunately, these two elements cannot easily be separated. “The ‘hard 
power’ of military dominance and economic coercion is both maintained and transcended by the 
‘soft power’ of attraction and emulation” (Cox, 2005: 672-673); while, “the protective role of 
military force is a relevant asset in bargaining among states” (Nye, 1990: 160). With the waning of 
economic resources the government has refocused its foreign policy towards a more ‘soft’ approach 
but has found itself in a tough predicament. The Canadian government wanted to use the “powers of 
persuasion through the mobilization of ideas, rather than coercion or economic inducements” 
(Granatstein & Hillmer, 2007:5). However, without the appropriate levels of funding to the military, 
Canada’s peacekeeping abilities decline significantly.  
 
Currently, the Canadian military is “among the weakest in the industrialized world, and the weakest 
since the post-war re-armament” (Cohen, 2003:27). A decline in the resources being provided to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has meant Canada’s ability to 
participate in international initiatives has been downsized.  When Canada “seeks to be active, 
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Canadian influence on key international events and issues appears limited” (Nossal, 2003:12).  
Canada’s prominence in bodies such as the G8 is no longer as important as it once was, there is also 
less funding towards defence, and development assistance. These are factors which are detracting 
from Canada’s middle power status on a continual basis. DFAIT does not have the same capacity as 
it once did, its initiatives have been scaled back significantly and it no longer has the same abilities 
as it once did.  
 
Canadian soft power does not derive from the size of the military “but rather from the attractiveness 
of Canadian values: human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes” (Welsh, 2004:587). Lloyd Axworthy, one the most notable of the post-Cold War 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, was attracted to the idea. By use of soft power in foreign policy 
Axworthy attempted to propel Canada back into the forefront of the middle power pack. He 
introduced some very valuable initiatives such as the Ottawa Treaty, a convention to ban the use of 
landmines and led a campaign against the use of child soldiers. Due to the intense economic 
pressure the country was facing, “Axworthy tailored soft power to fit a climate of continuing fiscal 
restraint and “middle-power possibility.” … Canada could lead through its moral example and the 
cultivation of relationships in the international sphere” (Granatstein & Hillmer 2007: 9). But like 
many other elements of the Canadian infrastructure, the department of foreign affairs was also 
subject to a major downsizing and there was not the same degree of funding available to soft power 
initiatives. Although Axworthy did his best to compensate for a tight budget, and indeed won some 
prestige for Canada through his efforts, it was not enough to offset the limited resources his 
government made available for foreign, aid and defence matters.  
 
Although Axworthy was a very influential Minister of Foreign Affairs, he did have many critics. 
Some view his middle power initiatives as “on the cheap,” employing the “squishy notion” of soft 
power to justify reductions in defence spending” (Granatstein & Hillmer 2007: 15-16). The idea of 
‘soft power’ had become chic and something which could be easily touted to the Canadian public 
with little resistance; “if soft power is the order of the day, who needs the expensive tools of 
traditional hard power?” (Granatstein & Hillmer 2007: 16) 
 
3.4.4 The Decline of Canadian Hard Power: The Military and Peacekeeping 
 
 
Granatstein and Hillmer (2007) ask if:  “soft power, moreover, all “soft” and no “power,” [is] a 
pretext for the depletion of Canada’s hard power resources and for the neglect of the Canadian 
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Forces?”  Granatstein is especially discontented with the depletion of the Canadian military. Has the 
shift to soft power as opposed to hard power directly led to the dwindling of the Canadian military?  
 
There is evidence to support Granatstein’s concerns. Though Canada undertook high profile 
commitments in Croatia, Bosnia and the Kosovo campaign in the 1990s, maintaining them was a 
strain on the military. This was true even though the garrison in Germany and the Canadian 
contingent in the UN mission in Cyprus were scrapped. By sending troops to Afghanistan in 2001 
and keeping them there fore a decade (until 2011, when the commitment expires), Canada has 
placed its military under severe strain. Some of the soldiers in Afghanistan are on their fourth 
rotation – or even more.  
 
All this contrasts with the utopian ideal of a peacekeeping nation which is often seen as a  “beacon 
of Canadian collective identity” (Bosold & Hynek, 2010:xix).  So much so, that images of 
peacekeepers are depicted on the ten-dollar bill.  For many years this representation was true; 
Canada contributed the highest ratio of peacekeepers to the United Nations of any country in the 
world. Canadian peacekeepers were once part of every single peace keeping mission and made up 
about “10% of overall peacekeeping personnel” (Welsh, 2004:585). However, this is not the case 
today, Canada’s ranking as a contributor country is consistently plummeting “and [it] has to turn 
down a series of requests to send its forces to war torn countries” (Welsh, 2004:585). Since the 
United Nations first deployed peacekeepers in 1948, Canada has contributed over 125,000 
peacekeepers to various areas of conflict. Unfortunately Canadian “military officials now 
acknowledge that they simply do not have the resources to commit to any new missions” (Foreign 
Policy, 2004: 15). 
 
The trend can be seen most clearly in examining the long-term progression of Canadian force levels 
and military spending. Military spending remained the single largest item in government budgets 
until the end of the 1960s. Because Canada was so very prosperous during that time, high military 
expenditures actually declined as a proportion of GDP, while force levels rose to their peacetime 
high of 123,000 in 1961.  
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Graph 1 
 
(Chart IV Robinson & Ibbott, 2003:9). 
 
At the time, Canada could easily undertake the complicated mission of managing the logistics and 
specialized troops necessary for the large UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai after 1956 (UNEF). 
Pearson described peacekeeping as an “intermediate technique between merely passing The mission 
in the Suez Canal showed the world “the adaptability and skill of the armed forces, then relatively 
well-equipped with transport aircraft and all the accoutrements of a mini great power” (Granatstein, 
1970: 414). Though on the decline, Canada’s military at that time was still substantial. This gave 
Canada the hard power needed to uphold its middle power position while acting as peacekeepers.  
 
But then in the 1960s as universal health care and comprehensive pensions began to bite into the 
budget, military spending began to shrink. Even though there has been an increasing need for 
peacekeepers all over the world, military spending has been on the rapid decline since the 1960s 
and has now evened out at a very low level (Graph 1 and 2), directly affecting Canada’s ability to 
take part in peacekeeping missions.  
 
Throughout the Trudeau era (1968-1979, 1980-84) he “relegated peacekeeping to last place in 
[Canada’s] defence priorities, placing emphasis on needs closer to home” (Holloway, 2006:105). 
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Despite this, Canadians were still a strong contingent in peacekeeping missions. and were known 
for their “special competence in logistics, communications and air transport” (Holloway. 2006:106). 
This was a reputation that Canadians liked and soon enough Canadians were urging the government 
to send in peacekeepers to areas of conflict, such as the Congo in 1960 (Granatstein, 1970:415).  
 
In the decades after Suez Canal, Canada’s commitment and abilities were already being questioned. 
A mere fifteen years later the Canadian forces were coming under question. “Why should a nation 
of less than twenty million keep a military apparatus of a microcosmic great power? Why should a 
small country spend almost $2 billion each year to keep up appearances?” (Granatstein, 1970:415).2 
Perhaps Canada’s heyday of peacekeeping dissipated almost as quickly as it began and was over in 
the mid 1960s.  
 
The end of the Cold War also signified a shift in the type of conflict globally. No longer were the 
majority of conflicts occurring between separate states, they were occurring within states. Naturally, 
this changed the formation and tactics of UN peacekeepers. This new form of peacekeeping within 
states is often referred to as second generation peacekeeping (Hynek & Boslold, 2010, Nossal et al. 
2011). As opposed to separating the opposing forces and creating a place of neutrality there has 
been a shift towards peace building operations (Hynek & Boslold, 2010). This coincided with 
another shift in government spending. Since the deficit had grown throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s the new government under Jean Chretien had to refocus its budget. Military spending felt the 
effects of the reduced budget. As a result, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy shifted 
his policy to embrace a policy of soft power distancing himself from the military. Axworthy said in 
1998, “the use of soft power- rather than coercion, powerful ideas rather than powerful weapons, 
public diplomacy rather than backroom bargaining- is an effective means to pursue the human 
security agenda” (Rigby, 2001:41). The lessening of funds to the military throughout the 1990s had 
dire effects on Canada’s abilities to remain a significant contributor to peacekeeping missions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that over Dr. Granatstein’s career he changed his stance on Canadian issues. His 
opinions in 1970 differ from the opinions he holds currently.  
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Graph 2  
 
(SIRPI, 2009)  
Looking at both Graphs 1 and 2 it is clear to see that military spending has continually been on the 
decline.  In 2008 Canada spent about 1.28% of its gross domestic product on defence. Graph 2 
shows the downward trend of Canadian military spending in real terms. Meaning that when 
adjusted for the increase in the price level (inflation) actual spending has decreased over the period 
shown by the trend line. This upholds similar findings from the Canadian forces showing that there 
has been a negative growth in military spending from 1986-2006 at a level of -0.4 % in real terms 
(in nominal terms the growth was 2.2%) (National Defence, 2008:11). The numbers show how 
Canada has been committing less and less to the military and as a result less is going to 
peacekeeping initiatives. Today Canada has the “34th largest population in the world, but its regular 
armed forces are 56th largest, and it has the 77th largest reserve” (Cohen, 2003:27). However, Graph 
2 does show that military spending is on the rise, especially since 2006 when the Conservative 
government took office.  
 
Recent history attests to the failure of Canadians as mediators and peacekeepers, especially within 
Africa. Two major conflicts one right after another in the 1990s not only tarnished Canada’s 
reputation for peacekeeping but resulted in massive loss of life. Perhaps the most famous- the 
Rwandan genocide -- has left one particular Canadian general scarred by the lack of resources 
available to Canadian peacekeepers but also the ability for the United Nations to turn its back on the 
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slaughter of close to one million civilians. The previous conflict in Somalia led to global 
embarrassment on behalf of Canadian peacekeepers, military and the general population. The two 
peacekeeping disasters which occurred in Rwanda and Somalia are representative of Canada’s 
lessening abilities to send peacekeepers abroad. The events in both countries have greatly 
questioned Canada’s abilities as a traditional middle power.  
 
3.4.4.1 Canada’s Foray into Somalia 
 
Canada’s peacekeeping involvement in Somalia tarnished its reputation as protectors and mediators. 
The civil war in Somalia was particularly brutal: it started after the Somali president Mohamed 
Siyad Barre was ousted from power in 1991. This sparked a clan-based battle that prevented 
agricultural activity. The UN was sent in to provide the population with “desperately needed food 
and other relief supplies to the war-torn famine stricken country” (Thakur, 1994:388). The United 
Nations Operation in Somalia 1 (UNOSOM I) was created in 1992 ands was comprised of 
peacekeepers from all over the world. UNOSOM II was created to replace UNOSOM I at the end 
1992 due to the  “growing conviction that the existing course of Unosom would not be an adequate 
response to the tragedy” (Thakur, 2004:395). 
 
UNOSOM II had a strong Canadian contingent of about 1,400 troops mostly from the Airborne 
regiment. Within six months of their deployment the soldiers were called back to Canada. While 
stationed in Somalia three Somali civilians lost their lives at the hands of Canadian soldiers. 
Pictures and video of these events found their way to international media outlets and caused both 
international and national outcry. Within weeks of the soldiers’ return the Canadian Airborne 
Regiment was disbanded and a public inquiry was called. Not only was this a tragic event for 
Somalis it also enraged the Canadian population. The middle power nation “who knew themselves 
officially as peacekeepers of the world, as nonracist, and as uninvolved in conquest and other 
imperial acts confronted in a dramatic way the possibility that the reality was otherwise” (Razack, 
2000:128). 
 
The enormous failure of Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia exposed the world to a darker side of 
Canada. It revealed the extent to which the forces were overstretched, and the personnel from the 
airborne regiment were only sent because  “the army, with troops in the Former Yugoslavia and in 
other peace support operations, was so overstretched that it had no other available unit—despite 
fears that the Airborne’s personnel and leadership were below the requisite standard” (Granatstein 
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& Hillmer, 2007: 25). Those involved in the killings and beatings were charged with crimes and 
dishonourably discharged from the military but what these individuals had done was much more 
than just that. They had embarrassed a middle power which prided itself on its good governance, 
fairness and above all its reputation as a global peacekeeper. This tragic event in Somalia 
unfortunately was the first of two of a major crisis for Canadian peacekeepers, the second only to 
follow two years later.  
 
3.4.4.2 Canada’s Mismanagement in Rwanda 
 
When the wounds of the Somali affair were still fresh Canada participated in another peacekeeping 
mission in Africa (perhaps an attempt to rebuild its tarnished reputation), but this time in Rwanda. 
The genocide in Rwanda not only questioned Canada’s role but “diminished  even more the world’s 
expectations in traditional peacekeeping as well as the United Nations’ mechanisms to cope  with 
the kind of  organized violence that had surged in Central Africa”(Von Bredow, 2009:170).  
 
The Rwandan genocide took place within 100 days between April and July 1994. In that short 
amount of time somewhere between 800,000 and 1 million people were executed. “The conflict had 
pitted the Rwandan government, favoured by the  Hutu majority, against a rebel movement, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), made up of mainly refugees from the Tutsi minority” (Holloway, 
2006:109). The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was sent into negotiate 
a power sharing agreement in 1993. When the peace process ended in April 1994 Hutu extremists 
encouraged genocide against the Tutsi minority.  
 
UNAMIR was a relatively small mission with just over 2,500 troops mostly from Belgium, Ghana 
and Bangladesh but led by a Canadian general, Romeo Dallaire. Initially the RPF targeted the 
Belgians which resulted in ten Belgian peacekeepers being killed.  Consequentially,  all Belgian and 
Bangladeshi peacekeepers withdrew from the mission reducing UNAMIRs numbers and capacity. 
Dallaire called upon the UN and the Canadian government to send in more resources but neither 
stepped in. Since the missions capacity was reduced so much Dallaire and his peacekeepers 
watched the genocide occur right in front of them (Holloway, 2006:110). Hundreds of thousands if 
not one million people perished in a short amount of time despite Dallaire “campaign[ing] to 
increase international response to the Rwanda genocide” (Brysk,2009:85-86).   
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"The Rwandan genocide happened because the international community – if I may be brutal, as the 
genocide was – didn't give one damn for Rwandans because Rwandans don't count. Rwanda is of no 
strategic value to anybody, and has no strategic resources." – Romeo Dallaire (CBC News, 2004)  
What happened in Somalia and Rwanda represents a significant shift in the capabilities of 
international system. It showed that a “new international security landscape [had emerged] with 
new threats, risks, and dangers”(von Bredow, 2009:170). These new threats demonstrate how 
difficult it is to contain and manage modern conflict.  Both failures showed the holes in the 
international peacekeeping regime which is not only strongly upheld by Canada but also, in part 
developed by Canada.  
 
The decline of Canada’s middle power status is directly linked to the decline of Canada’s military 
spending. This has resulted in a lessened capacity to commit peacekeepers. Starting in 2006, 
Canadian military spending has risen (as a percentage of the GDP), however, it is still at levels 
below 1988. 
To maintain a status of middle power “it is not enough for a country to have attractive values and 
ideas. It also needs the capacity to disseminate and, more importantly, implement them” (Welsh, 
2004: 588). Without the proper funding of the military it has been increasingly difficult for Canada 
to find the proper balance between hard and soft power. With a lack of funding and manpower 
Canada can no longer be seen as a peacekeeping nation in the same capacity.  However, Canadians 
remain  “attached to peacekeeping roles, almost as if these were an outward expression of the 
Canadian character as well as a commitment to international responsibilities” (Granatstein & 
Hillmer, 2007:26).  
 
Canada was once the largest contributor of peacekeepers up until 1992. In 2005 only 83 Canadian 
military personnel were a part of UN peacekeeping missions despite the increased global demand 
for UN peacekeepers (Robinson, 2009:6-7).Today Canada sits “58th behind Uganda and just ahead 
of Zimbabwe. Canadian participation in peacekeeping now consists of only 99 policemen, 37 
military experts and 24 soldiers” (Leger & Lemay-Hébert, 2010).  Where the Canadian military was 
once able to offer intelligence, manpower and technology they are no longer able to help in the 
same capacity.  The disasters which took place in Somalia and Rwanda are a reflection of Canada’s 
limited capacity both to get troops to Africa and, probably more important, Canada’s inability as a 
middle power to mobilize an international coalition that could do it.  
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3.4.5 Canada’s Official Development Assistance  
 
Official development assistance (ODA) has often been seen as a cornerstone of Canadian foreign 
policy and is a good indicator of how Canada’s middle power status is declining. This section 
examines Canada’s history of ODA, then compares its commitments to ODA compared to other 
traditional middle powers in the 20th and 21st centuries.  
 
ODA has been a way for Canada to fulfil its role as a middle power by contributing to global 
development. Canada’s ODA “came to be seen as a vital instrument of foreign policy and as a tool 
to promote democracy and stave off the threat of Communism in the newly decolonized states of 
the developing world” (Tomlin et al.2008:156). Though some aspects of ODA have changed over 
the years its underlying goals have generally remained the same. Generally, the goals of ODA are to 
try and help alleviate poverty, promote democracy, and uphold security. Both the population and 
the Canadian government view ODA as a way not only to maintain middle power status but to also 
be a helpful fixer and help protect Canadian values. Canada’s ability to help others abroad and 
allows some Canadians feel like they are making the world a better place. For many citizens it was 
not as much about the economic and geopolitical factors it was more about the “ethical 
responsibility towards those people beyond their borders who were suffering severely” (Waisová, 
2009:82).  
 
The post September 11th era posed new challenges to Canadian international assistance.  The 
security threat was very close to Canada and forced the government and population to rethink its 
stance on international development. A “weakening of the moral motivations and humanitarian 
aspects of ODA” (Waisová, 2009:83) had occurred which resulted in a shift occurred from humane 
internationalism to a more security dominated foreign policy.  
 
Canada’s official development assistance program started in 1950 with the Colombo Plan in 1950 
(Smillie, 2009:184). This initiative helped lay “the foundation for ‘Co-operative Economic 
Development’ in South and Southeast Asia” (Tomlin et al.2008:156). By the end of the Colombo 
plan Canada had given $331million in aid. By the end of the 1960s foreign aid became an important 
theme in Canadian foreign policy “spreading beyond its initial half-dozen Asian programs to Africa 
and the Commonwealth Caribbean” (Smillie, 2009:183). Pearson was clear that ODA was meant to 
“reduce disparities and remove inequalities [so that] the poorer countries can move forward…so 
that the world will not become more starkly divided between the haves and the have-nots” (Pearson, 
1968). Pearson in 1969 attempted to set an international benchmark of .7% of the GNP to go 
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towards ODA (Brysk, 2009:75).  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s ODA grew substantially. ODA 
reached its peak in 1975 when it reached .53% of the GNP. Throughout the 1970s there was 
continued support of ODA by Canadians but its support was waning (Tomlin et al. 2008:173).  
 
During the Cold War security and warding off communism was of the utmost importance. The 
threat of communism was very real and western powers wanted to keep it contained. ODA was a 
way to try and help uphold Canadian security interests abroad through promoting development in 
Asia or Africa. Aid also filled economic interests it “allowed underdeveloped countries to buy 
something from Canada, and not from somewhere else” (Bothwell, 2007:113).   
 
Since its creation in 1968 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has managed 
between 75-80% of Canada’s ODA (Smillie, 2009:184). CIDA itself has had problems since its 
inception. A revolving door of presidents and board members has created substantial confusion and 
a lack of transparency. Since ODA is not managed by the government directly but rather through a 
development agency (who only sometimes has a minister in the federal government) it is not seen 
as a high priority as it once was. Due to the mismanagement and red tape Canada is now “a 
significant but underperforming provider of humanitarian aide and good governance assistance at 
both the global and bilateral levels”, further undermining its middle power status (Brysk, 2009:75). 
Despite this, Canada still sits in the top ten providers in the world. As we saw earlier (above, p.38) 
there is a problem with Canadian aid, which is often tied “to Canadian providers and too focused on 
middle-tier potential trade partners rather than the neediest states” (Brysk, 2009:75). Canada clearly 
has put its economic interests first, tying its aid and shifting priorities from the least developed 
countries. 
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Graph 3: ODA 1960-2009  
 
Source: OECD.Stat (2010). 
 
By observing the ODA percentage compared to Gross National Income (GNI) for Australia, 
Sweden, Norway and Canada, it is clear that both Canada and Australia’s level of commitment is 
steadily declining. While Canada and Australia are on the decline both Norway and Sweden are on 
the rise having kept commitment levels above the .7% goal since the 1970s. 
 
Using the GNI versus the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) gives a more accurate reading of the 
percentage which is actually going towards ODA. The GNI is best explained as the GDP minus 
taxes, operational costs, and property costs (UN, 2009).3  The reason why ODA is measured in 
comparative terms against the GNI and not the GDP because GNI is the measure of the total 
available income for a country. From Graph 1, it is clear to see that Canada is falling far behind the 
standard set out by Pearson decades ago, and if the trend continues then it will just be falling further 
from the target of .7%.  
 
Compared to other traditional middle powers (Norway and Sweden) Canada has struggled to keep 
up. At no point in time since the 1960s has Canada reached the benchmark set out by its own 
                                                 
3 The United Nations Statistics definition of GNI is: “ GDP less net taxes on production and imports, less 
compensation of employees and property income payable to the rest of the world plus the corresponding 
items receivable from the rest of the world (in other words, GDP less primary incomes payable to non-
resident units plus primary incomes receivable from non-resident units” (UN, 2009) 
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former prime minister Pearson. The closest Canada has ever come to hitting the benchmark of .7% 
was in 1975 (at approximately .5%) and since that time the trend has been going downward. 
 
In 2002, Canada committed to doubling its foreign aid by 2010-2011.  After this target was reached 
in 2010 the government promptly froze its foreign aid commitments, and redirected them to the 
Americas. The 2009 budget showed “Africa to be the biggest loser… with eight of 14 nations no 
longer on the list, including Cameroon, Kenya and Rwanda” (CBC, 2009b). On the surface Canada 
has reached a milestone, the goal it set for itself of doubling its aid commitments in 8 years. On the 
other hand, the government has not committed itself to any new targets. This also affects Canada’s 
ODA to GNI percentage. As Canada’s GNI will continually increase, the ODA stays the same but 
the percentage of ODA to GNI will decrease perpetuating the trend set out in Graph 1.  
 
In 2007 the Conservative government made waves with the passing of bill C-293 or colloquially 
known as the “Better Aid Bill.” The bill itself speaks to Canada’s middle power legacy “ensur[ing] 
that all Canadian official development assistance abroad is provided with a central focus on poverty 
reduction and in a manner that is consistent with Canadian values, Canadian foreign policy, 
sustainable development and democracy promotion and that promotes international human rights 
standards” (House of Commons, 2007). At the time this bill was seen as pivotal, especially for 
upholding Canada’s reputation as a middle power. In the three years since this bill has passed little 
else has been done with regards to ODA or furthering the aims of the bill. What could have been a 
step in the right direction to upholding Canadian middle power status has fallen short of 
expectations and continues the trend of Canada’s declining middle power status.  It is becoming 
clear that Canada is going in the reverse of what the better aid bill set out to do, there is a freeze on 
development aid, less countries are receiving aid and there are no plans for change in the future. In 
contrast to the symbolism of the bill, the government though its foreign policy has been 
systematically dismantling its middle power status.  
 
With the current budget and government it is unclear where Canada is headed with regards to 
foreign aid and development. This is in contrast with the many middle power initiatives that Canada 
has been a part of in years past. It does not appear that Canada is committed to achieving the .7% 
ODA set out by its own former prime minister.  By comparing Canada’s commitments to Sweden 
and Norway it is clear to see that Canada is not living up to its middle power reputation through its 
foreign policy and development assistance.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
Throughout the second half of the 20th century “Canada’s internationalist foreign policy was rooted 
in a number of middle power characteristics, a combination of material conditions the expressed 
ideas and commitments of policy officials, and the support of Canadian society” (Keating, 
2010:10). It is understood that Canada was once “an agent of influence for moderation in the 
geopolitical middle; a crossroads and entrepot, politically, ideologically culturally, commercially 
and spiritually” (Molot & Hillmer, 2002:9). On the other hand, by looking at key elements of 
middlepowermanship such as the economy, the military/ peacekeeping and ODA it is clear that 
Canada is not able to uphold the middle power reputation it worked so hard to build up.   
 
Conceivably the beginning of the decline started in the Mulroney era, when the Conservatives 
added significantly to the national debt. When the next government came into power in 1993 they 
were burdened with a much larger deficit than expected (Nossal, 2003). Some even claim that 
Canada as a traditional middle power is a “myth” (Chapnick, 2000). Perhaps “myth” is too strong a 
word because in fact Canada was once a strong middle power, acting as a global citizen. Without 
trying to disparage the efforts of past Canadian governments it is important to see that in present 
day there is not the same commitment to international initiatives, whether they be exercises of hard 
or soft power. The current government maintains that Canada is still a middle power and has even 
gone to the extent to say that they might be, one day, an energy superpower (based on the potential 
of the Alberta Tar Sands and newly discovered gas deposits in eastern Canada). However, Canada’s 
lack of enthusiasm and funding for international initiatives stands in the way of middle power 
status.  
The reality of the latter half of the twentieth century is catching up with Canadians today. The 
economic boom in the post war era gave Canadians the impression that they could do anything, 
which in reality it could not. In the post war era through the Cold War until the end of the century 
the government was faced with many challenges. After the ravages of the Second World War the 
Canadian government had no interest in investing in a military to keep up appearances. When 
European economies caught up, Canada was no longer uniquely prosperous. With a softening 
economy the government needed to decide how to allocate the budget. The government was faced 
with a choice, either keep on investing in the military and foreign policy initiatives at the same rate 
or universal healthcare and extended pensions. The Canadian government chose the latter. It turned 
inwards and focused on Canada as opposed to other nations. This has had adverse effects on the 
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external capabilities of Canada for both hard and soft elements of power. Yet both government and 
people hold fast to the illusion that Canada’s standing as what it was a generation ago. 
 
It is not just a decline in levels of military or development expenditures. The softening of the 
Canadian economy in the 1970s, the recessions of 1981 and 1990, not to mention the recent 2008 
downturn, have slowed Canada’s overall growth significantly. By looking at specific aspects of 
traditional middlepowermanship, such as peacekeeping and official development assistance it is 
apparent that Canada’s status as a traditional middle power is weakening. Traditionally, 
“development assistance – along with peacekeeping- was viewed as the cornerstone of Canada’s 
middle power, internationalist vocation” (Tomlin et al. 2008:173). Today, these cornerstones are 
crumbling. It is clear that with the decline of hard power comes the decline of soft power and that 
the two are integral. 
 
 As a result, on a national level the population and the government have given into an idea of 
“nostalgic mythology” (Cooper,1997:7) of Canada’s influential past. This has allowed many 
Canadians to “exaggerate the significance of their past performances in world affairs” (Stairs, 
2003:1).  Unfortunately, it is thought that Canada is now “exactly in the position that our diplomatic 
service worked so hard to avoid in the 1940s through the 1970s” (Stairs, 2003:2).  
 
Canada’s weakening commitment to upholding its middle power status has shown that despite its 
“firm attachment to multilateralism and international institution building, their actual policy 
behaviour reveals that they have, at best, an uneven commitment to multilateralism” (Cooper et al. 
1993:22). There has been a magnification of the role that Canada has had in international 
organizations, conflicts and peacekeeping missions. Today that same position is slipping away. This 
is best understood through the relationship Canada and Zimbabwe share, where once Canada -the 
champion of human rights - held the commonwealth together over the Rhodesian question, has 
now, shied away from helping the crisis-ridden country.  
Chapter 4: Canada and Zimbabwe  
 
4.1 Introduction:  
 
Canadian foreign policies since the end of the Second World War have been constantly changing 
from realistic to idealistic policies, especially when it comes to foreign aid and development. There 
are two political parties who dominate Canadian politics: the Conservatives and the Liberals. Both 
have shown strengths and weaknesses throughout their time in the Prime Minister’s Office. The 
transformation from John Diefenbaker (1957-1963) to current Prime Minister Stephen Harper has 
shown Canada’s intermittent policy towards Southern African and Zimbabwe.   
 
By tracing the relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe from the end of the Second World War 
to present day gives a concise example of how Canada’s middle power status grew to be strong and 
then subsequently faltered.  The history between the two countries through the Commonwealth, the 
UN through to independence, the 2008 elections with many important events dotting the landscape 
in-between shows the interconnected relationship between the two countries. While the severe 
humanitarian crisis has been occurring in the past decade Canada has taken a backseat. The 
Canadian government has failed to help the people who are in dire need while taking a moral high 
ground by imposing targeted sanctions as opposed to actually helping.  
 
In the beginning both nations were creations – colonies -- of the British government. Canada, as a 
dominion, was a more senior colony, and by the 1930s was effectively completely autonomous or 
independent, while Southern Rhodesia, smaller and less economically evolved, had only internal 
autonomy. But Canada and the other dominions were seen as the model that Southern Rhodesia was 
expected to follow, and in that limited political-cultural sense relations were close.  In many ways 
the relationship between the two has been an example of how the Canadian government has used 
their ‘middle power’ to portray a position of helping other countries in crisis, where in reality, 
Canadian policy has very little impact on Zimbabwe- in terms of political, historical or economic 
relations.  
 
Regionally, Canada does have stronger ties with South Africa but has maintained relations with 
Zimbabwe through its own development agencies and international bodies. However, Canada’s 
presence in Zimbabwe has diminished. Throughout the 1960s under John Diefenbaker and Lester B. 
Pearson, Canada acted as initiators and orchestrators to encourage the struggle against minority 
rule. Interest in Rhodesia fitted Canada’s general interest in directing its foreign aid to the African 
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members of the Commonwealth, and it could be anticipated that Rhodesia, when independent under 
majority (African) rule, would join the collection of Canada’s aid recipients. After Pearson left 
office, Canadian policy towards southern Africa moved towards indifference. In the late 1970s-
1980s the policy shifted once more, to grand gestures and little action. Throughout the 1990s and 
until the switch to the current Conservative government there were some last efforts to salvage the 
Canadian reputation of good governance and peacekeeping in consistent with their middle power 
status. With the escalating instability in Zimbabwe the Canadian government has moved to enact 
smart sanctions towards Mugabe and government officials in ZANU-PF, but has done very little to 
help those who are most in need, helping diminish Canada’s middle power status.  
 
When examining Canada’s decline from middle power status in the world order, it is important to 
examine the actual events to which the policy responded, or against which it was set. Canada shares 
some history with Zimbabwe, as it does with other former colonies, making a case study possible.  
This chapter seeks to investigate the decline of Canada’s middle power status by using the 
relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe as a case study. Starting off with an account of 
Zimbabwe’s history is followed by an overview of some of the elements contributing to the current 
crisis in Zimbabwe, setting the stage for analysis of the relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe 
in the 20th and 21st centuries. The last section of the chapter looks to the future and asks: where has 
Canada gone? and what might be in store for the future between Canada and Zimbabwe.  
 
4.2  History of Zimbabwe   
 
Once seen as the most prosperous country on the African continent, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe spawned 
first a civil war that gained worldwide attention, and then an economic catastrophe with 
international repercussions. To understand Canada’s engagement, how it changed, and how it 
diminished, it is necessary to explain the current crisis in Zimbabwe and how things have become 
so dire so that one can fully understand the severity of Canada’s inaction in the country.  This 
section examines Zimbabwean history from pre-colonisation to the struggle for independence and 
the initial success of post- independence Zimbabwe. Then the section examines some of the 
important factors which contributed to Zimbabwe’s slide into crisis: the death of Sally Mugabe, the 
war veterans, the participation in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the 
fraudulent elections of 2002 and 2008 and the rise of the opposition. Lastly, this section looks at the 
current government which is a partnership between the two largest political parties.   
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4.2.1 Pre- Colonisation to Independence  
 
Unlike Canada and South Africa which were colonised by Europeans beginning in the 16th and 17th 
centuries Zimbabwe was not officially colonised until the end of the 19th century by the British. 
Until then it was a backwater trading with the Portuguese colonies on the coast. The creation of 
Rhodesia is seen as one of the last attempts of colonisation on Great Britain’s part, and part of the 
last European partition of Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:40). The British government gave Cecil 
Rhodes a charter creating the British South Africa Company (BSAC), permitting trade with local 
kings. BSAC was a commercial- political entity that focused on the exploitation of economic 
resources…” and the creation of a new atmosphere for further British political and economic 
expansion (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 46). BSAC was a colonising power in itself, able to raise its 
own police force, open banks, build roads - almost anything that the British government was able to 
do.  In the late 19th century, when Rhodes was disappointed by the failure to find gold deposits he 
granted farms to white settlers.  
 
In 1896 the Shone and Ndebele came together to fight the British. The coming together of these two 
conflicting peoples, it is claimed,  “eventually formed the basis of mass nationalism and future 
imaginings of an independent Zimbabwe” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 49). From the beginning the 
BASC constructed a “colonial state permeated by a ‘caste’ division between the settler (white 
Rhodesians) and the indigene (Ndebele and Shona)” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 59). The framework 
had been laid for a deeply racist and fractured country.   
 
In the post World War One, era many more white settlers came to Rhodesia looking for farmsteads 
in addition to the returning soldiers who were taking up farms as a part of a British Government 
Settlement Scheme (Mlambo, 2009: 76). In 1923 Responsible Government was granted. The influx 
of white settlers only added to the racial tension present, and eventually the clash between white 
and black produced violence. But for over thirty years the colony grew, and was considered an asset 
to the Empire. The short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland attracted very positive 
attention as late as the 1950s. But the break-up of the Federation and the creation of independent 
Zambia and Malawi was a indication of trouble to come. 
 
4.2.2 The Struggle for Independence 
 
In 1964 Ian Smith became Prime Minister of Rhodesia. He believed that the “The white man is the 
master of Rhodesia, has built it and intends to keep it." (Time, 1964)  Smith proclaimed unilateral 
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independence, provoking a sixteen-year clash between his regime and the British government, 
which was still the controlling power over Rhodesia, and a civil war between his government and 
insurgent black guerrillas. Eventually, with Mozambique independent, and the economic basis of 
white rule eroding, the Smith government gave way to a transitional regime. At that point, Smith 
had changed his tune: “I had always hoped we could avoid black majority rule in my lifetime. But 
you have to change your tactics in this game, and we came to the conclusion that if we didn't 
change, we couldn't survive" (Time, 1979). 
 
4.2.3 Independence: The Creation of Zimbabwe 
 
When Zimbabwe became an independent state under black majority rule in 1980 hopes were high 
that it would succeed politically, economically and socially. For a long time under the supervision 
of Robert Mugabe it did succeed that those three elements. Despite being under one party rule, the 
country seemed to be going in the right direction with the right person leading the way for a smooth 
transition.  In 1980, Zimbabwe was poised to succeed and be a leader for the continent due to its 
diversified economy, middle income status and a solid human resource base (Sachikonye, 2002: 
13). 
 
Throughout the 1980s Zimbabwe continually was growing stronger especially in terms of the 
education and social sectors, the economy was growing and Zimbabwe found itself being the 
regional breadbasket. In comparison to its SADCC neighbours Zimbabwe was a pillar of strength 
and stability. Many countries in Southern Africa were struggling to meet basic human rights to their 
citizens, while many Zimbabweans were enjoying high levels of education and healthcare. When 
comparing Zimbabwe today to itself twenty-five years ago one must ask what happened? Why did 
this country, which was seen as being prosperous and stable, somehow get it so wrong?   
 
4.3 The Zimbabwean Crisis  
 
Zimbabwe, for which the entire world had high expectations, has fallen into cyclical despair. From 
the top down the country has been mismanaged and subject to ostracism from the world. The 
‘crisis’ in Zimbabwe is far reaching to all facets of society. There is a continual food crisis which 
estimates 1.7 million Zimbabweans will need food aid in 2010/2011 (Tsele, 2010). There is also a 
massive humanitarian crisis where people are denied the most basic necessities to get by, a political 
crisis, which is, marred with violence and corruption also a health crisis where rates of infection, 
disease and death are rising drastically.   
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Unfortunately, the once prosperous country has become a point of contention in the world. What 
should be done? Who will fix it? But most of all- why? Why did this happen and how did it 
happen? On the surface it is easy to point the finger of blame directly on one person- Robert 
Mugabe but there are so many more complex elements than just one person. Investigating the 
decline of Zimbabwe is like peeling back the skins of an onion. It must be done carefully and 
gingerly. The historical imprint left by the days of colonisation is still very apparent. The ideals of 
the revolution are not forgotten and with the population struggling to survive things are only getting 
worse. Starting from the time of colonialism the seeds were sown for conflict up until today where 
the population is denied the most basic of necessities.  
 
Zimbabwean politics centred round one man, Robert Mugabe. In this personalised system, it is not 
surprising that events in Mugabe’s circle should be seen as having profound impact, either 
symbolising or even causing profound change. When asking some ex-pats, academics and 
diplomats who were once stationed in Zimbabwe what the turning point in Zimbabwe was they 
came up with one answer: the death of Sally Mugabe.4 Though Sally was from Ghana and was met 
with some suspicion by the Shona people her personality and dedication to Zimbabwe had earned 
her great respect. When she died in 1992 the entire country mourned along with Mugabe. She was 
able to help him act rationally and keep him grounded, something that his mistress and second wife 
Grace could not do. After Sally’s death Grace divorced her husband and married Mugabe. Not long 
after Mugabe’s second marriage Zimbabweans realised that Grace did not possess the same 
dedication and love for Zimbabwe as Sally had. The new first lady “personified the rapid increase 
in corruption amongst Mugabe’s inner circle and their lack of concern for the plight of the common 
man” (Meldrum, 2004:81). Soon after the marriage between Grace and Robert Mugabe the reality 
of political and economic corruption became apparent to all facets of society.  
 
4.3.1 The Continuous Slide into Crisis: War Veterans  
 
Mugabe’s increasingly dictatorial tendencies required the mobilization of non-traditional support, 
such as the War Veterans’ movement. Given the necessity of maintaining political support, Mugabe 
was willing to downgrade other factors, such as economic stability. The economy went into reverse. 
The help that was being given by the IMF and the World Bank were not helping the quickly 
                                                 
4 This question was asked to Linda Freeman, Professor of African Studies Carleton University, Ottawa; 
Charles Bassett former Canadian High Commissioner to Zimbabwe until 1993 and Ann Charles former 
Canadian High Commissioner to Zimbabwe from 1997-2000. 
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destabilising economy. Instead the loans given only “increased the debt, leading to further 
economic decline… the Zimbabwean economy collapsed, with the currency loosing 74%of its value 
in a single day” (Adelmann, 2004: 250). This was a direct result of the money being promised to the 
War Veterans. The amount was unsustainable and the value of the currency plummeted.  Today, 
Zimbabwe is ranked number one in the world as the most indebted at a rate of 304% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (CIA, 2010).   
 
4.3.2 War in Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
Zimbabwe chose to get involved in the conflict in DRC in 1997 as part of a SADC initiative to try 
and stabilise the conflict. When looking back to Zimbabwe’s decline its involvement in DRC is 
seen as major contributor to the despair felt today. The Zimbabwean forces and government were 
able to exploit the vulnerable situation for profit. Particularly, “the state encouraged entrepreneurs 
to penetrate the DRC market, citing the ‘attractiveness of low-cost, commercially useful, networks 
established by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces’” (Raftopoulos, 2010:203).  The resources necessary 
to keep Zimbabwe in DRC were far too expensive for the fragile economy. In addition to the 
inflation the country was facing this only furthered its economic problems.  
 
4.3.3 The Land Question: Farm Land and Redistribution 
 
The land redistribution program is another main factor into Zimbabwe’s slide into crisis. During the 
struggle for independence land ownership was a controversial issue. The redistribution of land from 
the white minority to the black majority is a sensitive subject in many parts of southern Africa, but 
especially in Zimbabwe. Even though land redistribution had been on Mugabe’s agenda his entire 
time in office, he initially promised the white farmers a fair price for their lands. But, by the late 
1990s little had been done and land redistribution was increasingly an issue. Mugabe demanded of 
the British government to help pay for the seizure of land “because it was in charge when the 
problem was created. [Mugabe also pointed] out that the colonialists did not compensate Africans 
when they first took the land” (BBC, 2000). Mugabe was able to justify his actions by declaring he 
was finishing “unfinished business” left over from the revolution (Freeman, 2005: 148).  
 
By mobilising ‘war veterans’ Mugabe wanted to fix the colonial legacy left behind. Through the 
land redistribution program he was able to gain great support from the rural population “who hoped 
for economic empowerment, but also from parts of the ruling class, who managed to acquire a 
substantial number of farms. Undoubtedly, the violent land reform and the break- down of 
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democracy and of the rule of law exacerbated the economic and political crisis.” (Adelman, 
2004:250). By 2002 “over 80 percent of Zimbabwe’s 4,500 white- owned commercial farms had 
been forcibly seized”(Bauer & Taylor, 2005: 177).   
 
Initially, Great Britain was a willing participant in the land redistribution program. They agreed to 
buy out white farmers/ landowners so that the majority of the farmland could be redistributed to the 
majority of the population. It was agreed that the UK would pay out £44 million but in the end 
came shy of £4 million. In the beginning the program was run in the appropriate manner but over 
time it “degenerated into a hand-out to ZANU politicians rather than to the smallholder farmers 
who were the intended beneficiaries” (Lipton, 2009: 337). The farm takeovers became very violent 
and often went to allies of Mugabe, or war veterans (or in many cases young people posing as war 
veterans). Great Britain refused to endorse these takeovers and withdrew funding.  At this time an 
unfortunate trend began to occur. Mugabe blamed the western world and especial Great Britain for 
all of Zimbabwe’s problems. It also became very apparent that “Mugabe generated the land crisis in 
his attempt to win the parliamentary elections in June 2000 and retain the presidency in elections in 
2002” (Freeman, 2005: 165). 
 
The effects of the land redistribution program was being felt as early as 2001, just one year after it 
began. Finance Minister Simba Makoni warned of imminent food shortages as early as July 2001 
(BBC, 2010). Less than one year later in April of 2002 a state of emergency was declared as there 
were serious food shortages and famine all over the country.  
 
4.3.4  The Rise of the Opposition:  
 
With the decline in the Zimbabwean dollar Mugabe and the ZANU-PF continually lost support, 
making room for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to evolve, led by Morgan 
Tsvangirai. The MDC arose  “out of a range of civic struggles, in particular the labour and 
constitutional movements…” (Raftopoulos, 2009: 209).  Since Mugabe was quickly losing his iron 
grip on the country (especially in urban areas) he turned to unsavoury methods of gathering support 
for his party which became increasingly violent. 
 
Tsvangirai was able to transform the quiet trade workers union into “the country’s most potent 
challenge to government” (Meldrum, 2004:115). MDC gained momentum especially in Harare, for 
once there was an alternative to ZANU-PF. This alternative was offered at a high price though. 
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Tsvangirai has been beaten, imprisoned, his followers killed, beaten and imprisoned and people live 
in fear of supporting the MDC. 
 
4.3.5 Elections  
 
Post independence Zimbabwe has encountered election irregularities since 1980. Coercion and 
political intimidation were tactics utilised.  The new Zimbabwean government “never created 
conditions for [elections] to be free and fair and gave the opposition parties very little space to 
campaign” (Muzondidya, 2009:177). ZANU-PF was able to use its power to use state resources for 
campaigning; radio, television, the military and police were at the disposal of the ruling party, 
creating a severely uneven playing field for the opposition.  
 
 Recent elections have been marred with irregularities and have drawn international condemnation. 
Though Zimbabwe has never been classified as a one party state per se, any challenges to the ruling 
ZANU-PF party have always been overcome. As the years have progressed election scandals have 
become increasingly worse. In the 2002 election the rampant corruption was so wide spread that the 
international community paid close attention. Initially the results were deemed ‘free and fair’ by 
both the South African president Thabo Mbeki and the Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. As a 
result of these elections, marred with irregularities and violence Zimbabwe was suspended from the 
Commonwealth.  
 
The elections in 2008 saw two main parties running, both ZANU-PF and MDC. The initial results 
showed that MDC triumphed over ZANU-PF but elections are only as good as the willingness of all 
parties to accept the results. By any reasonable standard, Tsvanguirai won and Mugabe lost, but, 
holding all the levers of power, Mugabe stayed in office. Eventually a fragile accord for power 
sharing was cobbled together, after considerable external pressure.  
 
4.3.6 Hope for the Future The Government of National Unity (GNU) 
 
In 2008 ZANU-PF and MDC agreed to come together and attempt to create some sense of viable 
democracy “that demonstrated respect for democratic values and human rights” (HRW, 2009: 4). A 
renewed sense of hope was found not only within Zimbabwe but by the rest of the world; a 
newfound optimism which had not been present in the past decade. The GNU could hopefully 
breathe into the former regional powerhouse and renew confidence. Two years later the political 
situation is still very bleak.   
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For many, Mugabe is the embodiment of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle and despite the 
policies of the past thirty years they still see him as a valued leader. Unfortunately for Zimbabweans 
the west views him as “an aged despot with a taste for excess” (Barber, 2005: 1094) who takes little 
account to the needs of the population.  Mugabe is unable to acknowledge that due to his political 
missteps the country is in a state of crisis. He blames the west for the problems which Zimbabwe 
has had since independence in 1980.  
 
From the death of Sally Mugabe through the economic ruination of the country to the lack of 
political freedoms Zimbabwe is still in a state of crisis. In spite of veiled attempts to make the 
country more transparent through the introduction of a power sharing agreement it has not been 
successful. There is systematic corruption through all facets of government:  
The judiciary is stocked with pliant judges who answer to the ruling party. Police no longer 
uphold the law, and sometimes participate in breaking it. Ruling party militias roam the 
country as formal and informal security forces and, acting as agents of the regime, frequently 
terrorize opposition supporters (Bauer & Taylor, 2005: 171). 
What makes the situation direr is that there is no end in sight and the population continues to suffer. 
The crisis in Zimbabwe is all consuming ranging from widespread hunger, absolute poverty, 
systematic corruption, lack of transparency and lastly, the absence of political freedom. Mugabe 
and the ZANU-PF have ruined the hope that the world once had for Zimbabwe. Mugabe has 
“spoiled what we had consoled ourselves was a good-news story of postcolonial redemption, and 
turned it against us in a vindictive and retro spirit of revived post- colonial bitterness and racial 
antagonism” (Kinsman, 2008). 
 
4.4 History of Relations Between Canada and Zimbabwe   
 
Since the end of colonialism, both Canada and Zimbabwe have developed into very different 
entities. Canada through its ties to Great Britain and the Commonwealth has had continuous 
interaction with Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. After World War One Britain placed tariffs on trade 
between former colonies. As a result, at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932 
a bilateral agreement was developed between Canada and Rhodesia. Canadians also advised on the 
short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the 1950s.  
 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Canada embraced the view that the age of empires and white 
domination in Africa was coming to an end.  Accordingly, Canada approved the break-up of the 
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Federation that it had previously advised on the principles of federalism. Canadian aid was 
promptly forthcoming to Zambia and Malawi, which could be seen as indirect pressure on the 
remaining white-ruled enclave, Rhodesia. Soon after, Canada supported the British government in 
its efforts to influence and then to confront Rhodesia, both before and after the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI).  
 
Overall, the Canadian/ Rhodesian relationship was sporadic which seems to be characteristic of 
Canada’s Southern African policy throughout the Cold War era. Freeman suggests that “Canadian 
activities in Africa can best be understood less as the product of major interests of immediate 
concern to Canada than of a number of structural and ideological factors in both the domestic and 
the international contexts” (Freeman, 1980: 794).  Especially throughout the Cold War Canada 
acted as a middleman to help contain Chinese and Russian expansion into the African continent. 
Often this support was given out secretly through the “remaining white-ruled states in Southern 
Africa and occasional tokens of support for black liberation” (Freeman, 1980: 795).  
 
In the post World War Two era Canada was still finding its footing and carving out its position as a 
middle power.  The Cold War was instrumental for Canada to make a name for itself as a middle 
power. Even though its aid at this point in time was irregular, it showed that Canada had the 
intentions of becoming a good international citizen. Since Canada was still relatively new to 
Southern Africa and Rhodesia it did not take the initiative to start aid programs but rather helped 
previously established programs (Freeman, 1980).  At the time Canada had a minute relationship 
with Rhodesia partially due to the few economic interests present for Canadians in Rhodesia.  
 
On the whole Canadians did take an interest in Rhodesia because it was part of the Commonwealth 
family and was birthed by the same British legacy as Canada. Perhaps the turning point for 
Canadian relations in Southern Africa was the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960. Even though the 
massacre took place in Johannesburg it is seen as a turning point in Canadian perception of racist 
government regimes in the region. The Massacre was highly publicized and for one of the first 
times it showed the cruel nature of racist minority regimes. Images of the Massacre were splashed 
all over newspapers and the news creating a strong visual impact.  The Canadian outcry over the 
events that occurred in Sharpeville carried over into the Canadian view of Rhodesia. At this point 
Canadian NGOs and churches began to provide Zimbabweans with support for their struggle by 
providing food aid and other forms of aid. Public Canadian attitudes towards the minority regime in 
Rhodesia became more pronounced throughout the 1960s.  
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As time wore on there was an increasing presence in both Southern Africa and Rhodesia through 
the sporadic offering of assistance. Development aid was seen as a useful instrument enabling 
Canada “to gain a presence inside many African countries in order to serve Western interests and to 
promote its own prestige” (Freeman, 1980:797). Canada’s presence in Southern Africa and 
Rhodesia acted as a tool to help promote Canada’s identity as a middle power showing its 
‘commitment’ to promoting stable development and human rights.  
 
4.4.1 Canada and Rhodesia: Relations Through Multi-Lateral Bodies  
 
4.4.1.1 The Commonwealth  
 
The Commonwealth was the lynchpin of Canadian Rhodesian relations. Throughout the 1960s the 
Commonwealth was a body that still carried influence in the world.  Strategically Africa was an 
important concern, especially with the increasing presence of the UN and the Commonwealth, 
along with other multi-lateral bodies. “Canada was inescapably drawn to the African imbroglio, as a 
member of the commonwealth and of the United Nations, where African votes had a clear political 
weight” (Bothwell, 2007:305). There was a strategic allure of being involved within Africa and 
maintaining a good relationship. Since Africa had strength in numbers it was necessary for Canada 
to create a good working relationship with many African nations. The Africans had the weight of 
numbers behind them, and any time they wanted could force Rhodesia onto the agenda.  African 
leaders were now able to put pressure on international bodies such as the Commonwealth to 
produce a Rhodesian policy. Since Canada did not have a direct policy on Rhodesia it became 
necessary to create one.  This was a strategic move on Canada’s part. As a middle power, the more 
international allies they had within multi-lateral bodies meant more support for Canadian initiatives. 
Canada would have more votes and a stronger say in issues on the international level.  
 
The Commonwealth had the potential to act as a platform for Canada to influence change within the 
body and have a stronger presence in the third world.  Diefenbaker was one of the first white 
Commonwealth leaders to take a stance against minority rule, but was not until after South Africa 
withdrew from the commonwealth that the Rhodesian issue was brought up. The Rhodesian 
question dominated or at least strongly influenced Commonwealth meetings throughout the 
remainder of the 1960s and through the 1970s. As a result, there could not be “direct” relations until 
Majority Rule, which did not occur until 1980.  
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Canada’s “relations” with Rhodesia were mostly through support of British efforts to impose 
sanctions and through UN activity. In 1959, a Canadian and an Australian were appointed to a 
British commission to investigate Rhodesia’s political prospects. When Lester B. Pearson came to 
office in 1963 he was ready to “try and persuade the Rhodesians to liberalise the franchise so as to 
ensure an African majority in due course” (Miller, 1974:190). The Rhodesian government was not 
open to majority rule and did not pay attention to what other Commonwealth members suggested. 
The British were beginning to feel the pressure, many Commonwealth countries were pressing for 
“majority rule in spite of the Rhodesian government’s disagreement” (Miller, 1974: 190). 
 
Traditionally, Canada aligned itself with Great Britain on the Rhodesian issue, as Canada always 
acted multilaterally especially with its senior allies. The Canadian government explained that 
because there were talks occurring between London and Salisbury and did not want to interfere in 
the Rhodesian question, “From 1962-1964 Ottawa had given it unreserved support to British policy, 
abstaining on all Rhodesian questions in the UN on the grounds that such action would interfere 
with consultations between London and Salisbury” (Freeman, 1997:30). But it was in 1964 when 
the Canadian government’s attitude changed and they began veering away from traditional British 
policy.  Canada took a stance on Rhodesia, which no other white former colony of Britain had 
taken. In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre Canadians were becoming increasingly aware of the 
inequalities of Southern Africa and as a result, the government worked to separate itself from the 
British stance. Aligning with traditional middle power theory Canada was standing up for 
humanitarian rights and trying to act as a mediator within the Commonwealth.  
 
Since relations between Canada and Rhodesia had been few, Rhodesia sought to expand them in the 
early 1960s. Canada was reluctant. If Canada were to accept accredited representatives in Ottawa 
and send representatives to Salisbury (now Harare) “this could easily be construed as showing 
approval of Rhodesian policies” (Watts, 2007: 338). Instead, Canada wanted to make a good 
impression with the newly independent African states. The only way Canada was prepared to 
reconsider its position within Rhodesia was if  “the Rhodesian Government implemented 
progressive policies [and only then] Canada [would] be disposed to review its policy” (Watts, 2007: 
338).   
 
In 1964, the Commonwealth was comprised of twenty countries, eight of which were African.  
“With an African dimension came new expectations that the association would work towards 
resolving racial problems such as the one in Southern Rhodesia” (Hayes, 1982: 141).  Even before 
the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers took place in 1964, Rhodesia was being discussed. 
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Members asked whether or not Rhodesia should be invited to the meeting. In the end it was thought 
that if Rhodesia was invited to the meeting then its presence might overshadow the rest of the 
conference (Watts, 2007: 329). There was also opposition from many Commonwealth nations such 
as Pakistan and Kenya to the idea of Rhodesia attending. These became the ‘unofficial’ reasons for 
why Rhodesia was not invited. Officially, the British government stated that: “because of the size of 
the Commonwealth, only representatives of fully sovereign states should attend the Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting” (Watts, 2007: 330).  This set a sombre tone for the Commonwealth meeting 
later that year.  
 
Lester B. Pearson, one of Canada’s most celebrated Prime Ministers  (1963-1968), brought the issue 
of Rhodesia forward within the Commonwealth. Pearson had an instinctive sense of looming 
political trouble. It was obvious to him that the Commonwealth with its Afro-Asian majority could 
split on the Rhodesian issue. Instinctively too, the Canadian prime minister defaulted toward 
mediation as a technique. Mediation required calm, and calm required hope. Pearson was an 
optimist and believed that utilizing methods of soft power and looking towards a better – was better 
than reverting to confrontation and walk-outs by the aggrieved African members, on the one hand, 
or by the British, on the other.  If it were not for Canada’s efforts at the Commonwealth meetings 
through his tenure the body might have dissipated. When Ian Smith was elected Prime Minister in 
Rhodesia in 1964, with an uncompromising demand for independence it was clear that the 
Rhodesian question was no longer avoidable.  
 
At the Commonwealth meeting that year the British, Australian and New Zealand contingents did 
not want to interfere on the issues of a “self governing colony as long as the government remained 
within the bounds of constitutional action” (Freeman, 1997:30) and wanted to leave Rhodesia off 
the agenda. This avoidance came to a boiling point. Black African leaders became infuriated with 
the inaction occurring in Rhodesia began to threaten to leave the commonwealth if the “principle of 
racial equality was not honoured” (Freeman, 1997: 31). Canada became an anomaly within the 
Commonwealth and seemed resistant to the “differences over Britain’s approach to the Rhodesia 
issue [which] had developed along colour lines” (Hayes, 1982:143). Canada did not want divisions 
over racial lines, but rather wanted to be an inclusive body. Pearson drafted a communiqué stating 
that:  
The Commonwealth has a particular role to play in the search for solutions to the interracial 
problems which are threatening the orderly development of mankind in general and of 
many particular areas in the world today.  
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As a community of many different races, the Commonwealth is itself an almost unique 
experiment in international co-operation among peoples of several races and continents. 
Within their own borders many of its members have faced and are facing issues raised by 
the coexistence of different cultures within a democratic society… 
 
The Commonwealth should be able to exercise constructive leadership in the application of 
democratic principles in a manner which will enable the people of each country of different 
racial and cultural groups to exist and develop as free and equal citizens  (Hayes, 1982: 
143-144) 
 
Wilson knew that much of the white British population sympathized with white Rhodesia and he 
therefore was nervous to take definitive action against the colony. Many African leaders, such as 
Milton Obote of Uganda, Abubakar Balewa of Nigeria wanted the British government to take 
military action within Rhodesia as they had in other former colonies. The problem, however, was 
that Rhodesia was a much more formidable military entity than three of Britain’s ex-colonies 
[Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika] where the British had briefly but effectively intervened early in 
1964 in support of their governments against mutinous troops. Canada did not agree with the use of 
force to secure majority rule in Rhodesia. This was an issue which Pearson was not flexible on, 
believing  that “nothing but chaos would come from attempting to use force to change the situation, 
whether this was military force, or even political or economic force used prematurely” (Hayes, 
1982:150).  
 
Canada supported racial equality and majority rule, two elements which were not present in 
Southern Rhodesia under Ian Smith. Pearson called for the “release of African leaders from 
detention and letting Smith know that the Commonwealth would neither recognize a unilateral 
declaration of independence nor give such a regime diplomatic support in the UN” (Freeman, 
1992:31). This only further bolstered Canada’s position as a middle power – it bolstered its image 
as a country that was committed to the rule of law and equal rights. Following in a true middle 
power path, Canada did not support military action in Rhodesia to try and bring down the 
oppressive government.  
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4.4.1.2 Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the United Nations 
 
In 1965, Ian Smith declared Rhodesia to be an independent state through the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence (UDI) the global community reacted quickly to deem it illegal. UDI would have 
entrenched racist minority rule further, without any opportunity for the black majority to gain 
democratic rights. On November 11, 1965 Smith and his cabinet ministers declared independence 
but maintained an allegiance to the crown. The next day the United Nations passed resolution 216 
condemning “the unilateral declaration of independence made by a racist minority” (UN, 1965). 
Furthermore, the resolution called on “all states not to recognize this illegal racist minority 
regime… and to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal regime” (UN, 1965). The 
United Nations viewed UDI as an act of rebellion and having no legal validity (UN, 1965a). Canada 
under allegiance to the Crown and the United Nations adhered to this resolution.  
 
After Resolution 216, Pearson became more vocal in his opposition to white Rhodesia urging, as a 
first step, moderate but very firm measures against Smith. Six months after Resolution 216, the 
Security Council recalled 216 and brought forth Resolution 221 calling “all States to do their utmost 
to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and 
petroleum” (UN, 1966).  This was the first time in its history the United Nations enacted sanctions 
against a state to try and bring down a government (Time, 1966). The sanctions forbade the then 
122 UN members from selling “oil, arms, motor vehicles or airplanes to the rebel territory or to 
provide it with any form of financial or other economic aid” (Time, 1966). Though the sanctions 
might have seemed appropriate there was very little which could be done to enforce these sanctions. 
South Africa was actively undermining the sanctions by providing oil and supplies to Rhodesia and 
other countries such as France believed that the issue should be left to Great Britain and not the UN 
(Time, 1966).  
 
In conformity with the United Nations’ stance, the Canadian government enacted both political and 
economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Pearson had hoped that this would make military intervention 
unnecessary. The government wanted to avoid any military intervention at all costs as it viewed 
military action as a last resort scenario. At this point in time Canada’s military spending was 
already on the decline (Graph 1) and the government had shifted its focus to peacekeeping as 
opposed to engaging in conflict. In the post war era Canada also had NATO commitments in 
Europe which it was bound to uphold. There was neither the ability nor the interest to start a 
conflict in such a far off and remote location which did not directly affect Canada. Despite Canada 
and Pearson’s best efforts to try and help the situation in Rhodesia through diplomacy, by the late 
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1960s many black African leaders thought of Pearson as a lot of talk and little action. One of the 
problems with enacting sanctions against a country so far away is that there is no way to actually 
enforce the policy. Meanwhile, Britain was continuously undermining the United Nations efforts to 
isolate Rhodesia. In 1966, the government allowed British petroleum companies including British 
Petroleum (of which the government held a 51% share ) to bring oil into Rhodesia from South 
Africa and Beria Mozambique (Freeman, 1997:33).  Since petroleum was still being imported 
through South Africa and Mozambique attempts to isolate Rhodesia through sanctions were not 
successful.  
 
4.4.1.3 UDI and NIBMAR 
 
No Independence Before Majority Rule (NIBMAR) was a policy that advocated the implementation 
of majority rule in Rhodesia. The policy was created to ensure the democratic rights of the entire 
population of Rhodesia were awarded before gaining independence from Britain. Initially, Britain 
was very hesitant to accept the policy and it was up to Pearson and the Canadian government to 
convince the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to accept because it was seen as a very 
controversial undertaking. NIBMAR was an example of how Canada was stepping away from 
Britain and supporting genuine majority rule. The British government would not agree to this idea, 
though they did agree with Canada that military intervention could be disastrous.  Pearson had to 
manoeuvre in-between the Afro-Asian contingent of the Commonwealth and the British trying to 
find a middle ground everyone could agree with. Eventually due to Pearson’s steadfast efforts, 
which swayed Wilson to accept NIBMAR and UN Security Council Sanctions against Rhodesia. 
Pearson played a very important role in upholding Canada’s middle power position “he was the one 
representative of the old Commonwealth who was able to meet the new Commonwealth half-way 
and thus to preserve some semblance of unity” (Freeman1997: 34).  
 
4.4.2  Trudeau Era: 1968-1979  
 
Known as Canada’s most charismatic Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau was elected to office in 1968, 
taking over the helm from Pearson. He took a slightly different approach to Canadian foreign 
policy, based on Canada’s limitations, while defining foreign policy as "the extension abroad of 
national policies" (DFAIT, 2008).  Despite a more nationally focused policy Trudeau did take a 
similar stance to Pearson on Rhodesia and NIBMAR. Similar to Pearson’s efforts at the 
Commonwealth meeting in 1964, Trudeau needed to mediate between Great Britain and the Afro-
Asian bloc in the Commonwealth. In his opinion, many African leaders were growing tired of the 
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often Eurocentric nature of the Commonwealth and the British government’s failure to “deal firmly 
with Ian Smith’s rebellious and unconstitutional unilateral declaration of independence” (Head & 
Trudeau, 1995: 99). The Commonwealth once again almost collapsed over the issue of racist 
regimes and minority rule. Trudeau stood up against “racial discrimination” within Southern Africa 
(Freeman, 1997:39).  Trudeau was successful in bringing the Commonwealth back together and 
recognized that “racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness.. and an unmitigated evil” (Freeman, 
1997:40).  
 
Overall, Trudeau’s position on Rhodesia wavered, in 1975 he said he would not support a black war 
of liberalization, however,  “he could understand the armed struggle of black freedom fighters” 
(Freeman, 1997:41).  Conversely to his predecessor, Trudeau said that he would settle for 
something less than NIBMAR if it had guarantees which would lead to diplomatic equality in the 
future. Members of the opposition parties were incensed by this statement seeing it as a betrayal of 
Canada’s middle power role and could damage the Commonwealth in the future (Freeman, 1997: 
36). The opposition would rather a firm plan guaranteeing rights at the moment as opposed to an 
ambivalent date in the future. The Canadian government’s waning support towards Rhodesia 
became increasingly frustrating not only for those suffering within the borders but also to the 
region. The lack of commitment and vagueness of Canadian policy was detrimental to Canadian 
relations within the region. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere who held great respect for Trudeau 
was disappointed in Trudeau’s “stonewalling” by the mid 1970s (Freeman, 1997:41).  
 
It was within this time the public began to mobilize.  Since the Canadian government was not being 
consistent in its approach to Southern Africa, groups of citizens including church groups, NGOs, 
academics, trade unions and university students came together to oppose the oppressive regimes in 
Southern Africa.  There was strong support for SWAPO in Namibia and the Zimbabwean cause 
(Freeman, 1997:70).  These groups were extremely effective in persuading general public opinion 
and businesses on Southern African issues and even released a Black Paper “as a critique of the 
government policy of ‘balance’ arguing for a greater priority to social justice” (Freeman, 1997:69). 
Through public persuasion Canadian banks quietly ended their financing towards South Africa. In 
1978 the Royal Bank of Canada announced that it had not made any new loans to South Africa 
since 1976 (Freeman, 1997:70). Private investors were selling their stocks and ensuring that their 
money was not supporting a minority government like those found in Rhodesia and South Africa. 
One civilian sold $400,000 worth of stocks of a Canadian based mining firm Falconbridge who had 
interests in Namibia (Freeman, 1997:70). This shows the sway that the Canadian public had over 
business and government practices. 
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Overall, the Canadian governments policy toward Southern Africa in the 1970s is thought of as a 
‘soft’ answer to the regional problems. Instead of contributing directly to assist the struggle or aid 
those most in need the government took a different approach. The government was apprehensive to 
give aid to black southern Africans, so instead they invested in international education programs 
with no direct ties to Africa (Freeman 1980:85). From 1973-1978 no budget was assigned 
specifically to fund educational training programmes for black southern Africans “and authorities 
made every effort to minimize direct assistance to the liberation movements” (Freeman, 1980: 805). 
Instead of establishing programmes to help those who fell victim to the oppressive governments the 
Canadian government waited for other nations or organizations to invite them to join.  The indirect 
investment in southern Africa shows Canada’s waning middle power status. The Canadian 
government was allocating just enough aid to  come across as making a difference without actually 
making one.  
  
The Canadian government’s waning middle power stance is especially evident towards the 
liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. As a middle power Canada was against the use of violence, 
“counselled moderation, and provided minimal support” (Freeman, 1992: 42) even though Trudeau 
himself expressed his understanding for the movement.  Canada’s tactics through the 1970s were to 
create a credible name for itself through multi-lateral bodies while offering minimal support to 
black Africans so that they could try to “ameliorate the effect of Canada’s continuing economic 
relations with South Africa” (Freeman, 1992: 45). The reasoning behind Canada’s lack of support 
for the Zimbabwean movement was its  “adherence to the principle of non-violence” (Freeman, 
1980:805). Though the government easily turned a blind eye to  “the character of the white-ruled 
states against which these groups were fighting and with whom Canadian companies continued to 
do business” (Freeman, 1980: 805). Trudeau lost the election in 1979 and Liberal reign over the 
government was briefly interrupted for one year. It was during this year that Canada’s attitude 
towards the Zimbabwean struggle shifted.    
 
In the brief period where Joe Clark was Prime Minister (1979-80), full economic sanctions were put 
into place against Rhodesia. After the sanctions were in place aid to ZAPU and ZANU was seen as 
“acceptable” (Freeman, 1997:124). When the Canadian government officially acknowledged the 
Zimbabwean struggle in 1979, it was met with public a mixed reaction. There were large groups of 
people who had been supporting the Zimbabwean cause for years but there were also citizens who 
accused the government of supporting “violence, embracing chic causes, abuse of aid money, as 
well as support for terrorists and ‘communists’” (Neal et al 1992:123). It was difficult for the 
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government to try and appease all parties. After decades of indecisiveness on the Rhodesian 
question Canada was finally supporting the struggle to try and end oppression. By 1979 the 
Rhodesian government understood that it had no hope to win the endless war and the transition to 
independence began. By this time, Zimbabwe was fully into its transition and Canada’s backing of 
ZAPU and ZANU was irrelevant. 
 
4.4.3 Canada and Post- Independence Zimbabwe  
 
Canada like most countries in the world had a strong sense of optimism for the success of 
Zimbabwe after its independence. After independence in 1980, the Canadian government did 
establish diplomatic missions in and also launched “a major program of development assistance in 
the region” (Freeman, 1992: 43).  When the Cold War ended Canadian aid policies became more 
transparent. CIDA stepped in and donated substantial time, energy and money into the stabilization 
of Zimbabwe and Southern Africa, especially in the face of crisis.  
 
As the implementer of ODA, CIDA acted as the middleman between Canada and Southern Africa. 
Money for development programs grew from under $1 million CAD in 1970 to $150 million in 
1988-89. Canada supported SADCC to create a more stable Southern Africa in the wake of South 
Africa’s systematic promotion of instability (Freeman, 1992:43). This was a way of Canada 
“expressing its social justice values, to balance the desire to have economic growth through 
continuous trade and investment with South Africa” (Freeman, 1992: 45). Canada’s commitment to 
Zimbabwe and other Southern African nations throughout the 1980s can be seen as a gesture 
towards the region. Despite the social and political consequences for doing business in South Africa 
Canada was still present in the apartheid regime. By contributing to the region the Canadian 
government was trying to offset its substantial economic involvement in South Africa.  
 
On numerous occasions Prime Minister Mulroney partnered with Mugabe in their stance against 
South Africa. At the Commonwealth Meeting in 1985 Mulroney worked with other Commonwealth 
leaders including Mugabe to try and convince Great Britain to use sanctions against South Africa. 
As a monumental gesture, in 1987 Prime Minister Mulroney was the first Western head of 
government to visit independent Zimbabwe. His trip to southern Africa is often seen as the “high 
point of the Canadian government’s commitment to strong action in South[ern] Africa” (Freeman, 
1997:164). This was undertaken not only through the Commonwealth but had a loose aim to 
increase bilateral relations with Zimbabwe.  However, a concrete relationship between the two 
nations never evolved.  
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Canada appeared to stand in solidarity with Zimbabwe against apartheid in South Africa. Despite 
efforts on the surface to distance itself economically and politically from South Africa, Canada 
maintained strong economic ties. There were a series of sanctions which the Canadian government 
had passed in the 1980s  which covered a range of activities from banning agricultural products, to 
forcing South African Airlines to close up shop in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. In reality 
these sanctions were not enough to make a great difference.  
 
Privately owned companies found a loophole and ignored “the government’s ban on new 
investment in South Africa” (Freeman, 1997:163). Mining companies such as Falconbridge 
continued to invest and expand in South Africa, undermining the sanctions which many nations 
tried to enforce. Throughout this time period trade between Canada and South Africa increased, 
despite the public displays of solidarity against apartheid with Mugabe and other leaders in 
Southern Africa.  The trade figures between Canada and South Africa for 1988 showed arise of 
68% on imports and rise of 44% on exports compared to 1987 (Freeman, 1997:221). The post- 
independence relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe was two-faced. On the outside Canada 
seemed to uphold the ideals of middlepowermanship. Canada as a stable democracy was supporting 
democracy and human rights, following the characteristics of middlepowermanship. By engaging in 
talks with Mugabe and working with the Commonwealth to try and isolate South Africa Canada 
portrayed itself as a traditional middle power. Meanwhile, Canada was not acting on the same ideals 
it was trying to uphold. By engaging in trade despite the sanctions, which Canada in many ways 
helped, pioneer was contradictory. The trade that occurred between Canada and South Africa 
helped contrite to the economic destabilization of the region.  
 
Again the theme of Canadian talk and little action came into play. South Africa was weakening the 
regions economic stability; former Zimbabwean foreign minister Nathan Shamuyaria estimated that 
there was $35 billion in loss due to the effects of South Africa’s regional destabilization (Freeman, 
1997:222). Even though Canada had pledged solidarity with Zimbabwe in opposing South Africa 
there was minimal action. The Zimbabwean government became increasingly impatient with 
Canada’s continued business dealings with South Africa. Despite the fact Canada spearheaded 
Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa they were indecisive and the sanctions were only 
optional and did not put a complete end to business between the two.  If sanctions against South 
Africa were ever to be effective, they had to be implemented, and really enforced, by all if the 
major economies, not only the Commonwealth but also the Europeans, Japanese and Americans. 
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Unfortunately, this did not happen so Canada’s quiet diplomacy initiative failed to make a 
substantial economic impact on the destabilization of the region.  
 
Nearing the end of Mulroney’s tenure as Prime Minister he scrambled to gain more notoriety as a 
champion of human rights and good governance. Increasingly he spoke out against South Africa’s 
apartheid government and talked more about increasing aid to the region. “Canada would 
‘increasingly be channelling our development assistance to those countries which show respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms’ ” (Freeeman,1997:252). This enraged Mugabe and he felt that it 
would be “wrong to buy the policies of the government, to try and change them through aid” 
(Freeman, 1997:253). But Mulroney attached stipulations to the donation of aid and said that 
Canada is “entitled to decide what takes place with the money of the taxpayers of Canada” 
(Freeman, 1997:253).  
 
By the end of Mulroney’s time in office in 1993 substantial financial strain was put on the Canadian 
economy. When the newly elected Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien came to power he was 
faced with a very large deficit. The resulting belt-tightening did not leave much room for 
middlepower pretensions. This had effects on all facets of foreign policy, and even on the 
relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe.  
 
4.4.4 The 2002 Elections , Canada, NEPAD and the G8  
 
As Canada was trying to preserve the last vestiges of its middle powermanship they held the 2002 
G8 summit in Alberta. The New Partnership for African Development (NEAPD) was a significant 
theme throughout the G8 Summit. NEPAD is an initiative started in conjunction with the African 
Union to promote economic stability and better governance throughout Africa.  What is unique 
about NEPAD is that it is more of a philosophy and a guideline than an actual policy. NEPAD itself 
it not a concrete structure or body it is a “a strategic vision that asserts many truths about what 
needs to change” (Herbert, 2002:93). NEPAD was inspired by South African policy on the African 
Renaissance, and to give African solutions to African problems. The goals of NEPAD are very 
broad aspiring to unite the continent by brining accountability, good governance and bring down 
poverty. NEPAD aimed to achieve its goals by “bringing about peace and political stability, 
instilling respect for human rights and political freedom, enshrining good economic and political 
governance and launching programs to address Africa’s shortcomings in infrastructure, education, 
and health” (Herbert, 2002: 97). 
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NEPAD was to be officially launched at the G8 Summit that year but its commencement was 
hindered by the elections in Zimbabwe.  Canada had intentions to fully support NEPAD. Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien helped spearhead the multi-billion dollar Africa Action Plan initiative to 
work multilaterally with other nations for positive development on the continent. Chrétien is quoted 
as saying "Today we have a deal and a deal that represents a new beginning and fresh hope for the 
African continent" (BBC, 2002). 
 
For NEPAD to succeed multilateral support was required.  As the host of the G8 summit where 
NEPAD was presented Canada was instrumental in developing the initiative. Chrétien pledged $6 
billion over five years to help reduce debt in Africa (CBC 2002a). There was one issue, which 
hindered the ratification of NEPAD-- the 2002 Zimbabwe elections. The legitimacy of the recent 
Zimbabwean elections became a vital point for NEPAD to proceed; South Africa and Nigeria’s 
stance on the elections was essential for NEPAD to pass.  Initially both South Africa and Nigeria 
deemed the Zimbabwean elections fair despite many countries rejecting them. Since Mbeki and 
Obasanjo were two of the main engineers of NEPAD they risked G8 support for the initiative. For 
Canada this was pivotal, as it was a Canadian by the name of Robert Fowler5 who orchestrated 
donors, stakeholders, development partners and multi-lateral organizations on top of the G8 to 
support NEPAD (CBC, 2009a). Eventually both Obasanjo and Mbeki criticized the Zimbabwean 
elections allowing for NEPAD to be discussed in full at the G8 Summit.  
 
By the end of the G8 Summit its members announced their commitment to the G8 Africa Action 
Plan (AAP). The AAP “includes over 100 specific commitments to Africa which mirrored the 
priority areas identified by the NEPAD framework document” (DFAIT, 2009). This led to the 
commitment to African Peace and Security endorsed by the G8 at the 2003 Evian summit. Canada’s 
position within the G8 allowed the government to exert its middle power status launching initiatives 
to advance development in Africa.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Robert Fowler was Canada’s longest serving permanent member to the United Nations, Canadian 
ambassador to Rome, Prime Minister Martin and Harper’s Representative for Africa. In 2000 he headed a 
commission which released a report citing the links between diamonds and conflict in the third world 
(known as the Fowler report). His report led to the creation of the international diamond certification 
scheme, the Kimberley Process. In 2008 he was asked by the Secretary General Ban Ki- Moon to lead the 
UN special envoy in Niger. In December 2008 he was abducted by al Qaeda and held hostage for five 
months; his release has been shrouded in controversy 
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4.4.4.1 Chrétien and Zimbabwe 
 
The 2002 elections were a turning point in Canadian- Zimbabwean relations. Initially the Canadian 
government held hope for the elections, that is, that they would be held in a free and fair manner in 
accordance with international standards. Chrétien himself did not want to be too quick to judge 
before results had been tabulated. But he must have had his suspicions, for he told the press "If the 
observers tell me that it was an unfair election, that Mugabe has won, stolen the election ... (then) 
suspension [from the commonwealth] is clear in my mind." (CBC 2002c). The Canadian contingent 
at the Commonwealth even went so far to allow Zimbabwe to stay within the body until the official 
Commonwealth election report was finalized. Unfortunately, the elections were deemed unfair and 
shrouded with irregularities, intimidation and violence.  Chrétien condemned the elections directly, 
adding that Mugabe or any of his officials were no longer welcome in Canada. Additionally, 
Chrétien said that aid would no longer be sent to Zimbabwe.  
 
After the G8 summit Chrétien went to South Africa for United Nations World Summit on 
Sustainable Development where he approached the issue in Zimbabwe directly. Chrétien made clear 
that he was opposed to the Mugabe regime and stated that Mugabe should “sit down with the 
opposition and make a government of national unity that will bring back more stability and more 
prosperity in the country" (CBC, 2002b). Much like Mulroney, Chrétien struggled to leave a 
positive legacy when left office. He wanted his legacy to include upholding Canadian moral 
standards by acting as a middle power to help secure human rights, democracy and put an end to 
poverty. This is clear through his passion for NEPAD and denouncing the Mugabe regime. In the 
end, his efforts were too little too late and a lot of talk and very little action, further discrediting 
Canada’s middle power status.  The impact of the 2002 Zimbabwe elections was felt all over the 
world, the stories of political violence were heard as far away as Canada.  If South Africa and 
Nigeria had not questioned the legality of the elections then NEPAD would not have come into 
effect. Canada was instrumental in getting NEPAD off the ground, however, with respect to 
Zimbabwe not much was done.  The G8 is an example of the waning power of the body, and 
represents the declining power that Canada as a middle power yields.  Canada could have taken a 
stronger stance against Mugabe and Zimbabwe and used this global forum to call attention to the 
widespread problems of the country. Instead, the G8 did draw attention to the crisis in Zimbabwe 
but did not help to implement a long-term solution.  
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4.5 Current Relations Between Canada and Zimbabwe: A Failure of Middlepowermanship  
 
Unlike other nations whose slide into ruination has also led to a slide into obscurity, Zimbabwe 
continues to make waves in the western world, even in Canada. Britain took a strong stance towards 
Zimbabwe and Canada closely followed suit (in the same fashion of the past). There are many 
reasons why Zimbabwe has become an international issue of such great magnitude. Since Canada is 
an active member of many multi-lateral bodies such as the United Nations, G8/ G20, and the 
Commonwealth it is customary for a middle power such as Canada to follow the path of the larger 
bodies. Another reason why Zimbabwe stands out is its close proximity to South Africa. Many 
international news agencies have their African headquarters in South Africa, which lies just next 
door to Zimbabwe. This allows for unprecedented media access into Zimbabwe (Adelman, 
2004:250). As an English speaking country with a shared British history it is easy for Canadian 
citizens to sympathize with the plight of Zimbabwe. It also makes it much easier for Zimbabwean 
politicians to be heard on the world stage as opposed to an interpretation.  Former South African 
president Thabo Mbeki argued that the west was obsessed with the crisis in Zimbabwe which 
contrasted with the west’s “lack of interest in larger and more destructive conflicts in Rwanda, 
Sudan, Angola and the DRC. In these cases, millions have died compared to several hundred in 
Zimbabwe” (Mbeki 2002). In his view the only reason why the crisis in Zimbabwe has garnered so 
much attention is "because white people died (about 12), and white people were deprived of their 
property" (Freeman, 2005: 153).  
 
4.5.1 The 2008 Zimbabwe Elections  
 
In the wake of the 2008 Zimbabwean elections the G8 decided to come together to propose 
sanctions against Zimbabwe. The two leaders in the proposal, the United States and Great Britain 
lobbied the G8 to come together to put forward a resolution against Zimbabwe through the United 
Nations. The United Nations sanctions would have targeted officials along with Mugabe and also 
included an arms embargo. Zimbabwean Information Minister Sikhanyiso Ndlovu charged that the 
sanctions were a “colonial and racist campaign against our country and government, [and that] this 
campaign[s] ultimate goal is to have their puppets in power,”(Chinaka, 2008). At the meeting July 
11th 2008 nine countries voted in favour while five voted against (South Africa, Russian Federation, 
China, Vietnam and Libya) and the resolution did not pass (Security Council, 2008). The United 
Nations resolution would have condemned the elections and the government’s  
…campaign of violence against the political opposition and the civilian population, which has 
resulted in scores of deaths, thousands of injuries, and displacement of thousands of civilians, 
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making it impossible for a free and fair election to occur, and expresses strong concern with the 
decision of the Government of Zimbabwe to go forward with the 27 June elections (Security 
Council, 2008) 
 
On September 4th 2008 the Canadian government officially imposed targeted sanctions on 
Zimbabwe in the aftermath of its controversial elections. The Foreign Minister at the time, David 
Emerson, cited electoral fraud and “violence against opposition supporters” (Ibbitson, 2009) as the 
reasoning behind Canada’s choice to enact sanctions. On behalf of the government, Emerson said, 
“Canada does not consider the result of the June 27 election to be, by any reasonable standard of 
democracy, a credible outcome. This ‘election’ is illegitimate and will not be accepted by the 
Government of Canada” (Brach, 2008). The Canadian government maintains that egregious human 
rights offences are taking place by the hand of the government, which is helping to perpetuate the 
economic, and humanitarian crisis occurring in Zimbabwe.  
 
 As a result of the Canadian government’s condemnation of the elections, the “Special Economic 
Measures (Zimbabwe) Regulations (SOR/2008-248)” came into effect. The elections “marked [an] 
escalation in human rights violations and violence directed at the political opposition, a stolen 
election, the denial of a peaceful democratic transition and a worsening humanitarian situation” 
(DFAIT, 2010). This forced the Canadian government to stand up and take action against 
Zimbabwe. The measures of the sanction include:  
       (DFAIT, 2010)  
 
The “targeted” or  “smart” sanctions only apply to a certain group of people and organizations. 
They do not have a great effect on the entire population. With smart sanctions only those who have 
direct connections to the ruling ZANU-PF party are being targeted. In theory Canadian sanctions on 
Zimbabwe are used to increase “pressure on President Robert Mugabe and his colleagues to cease 
 A ban on the export of arms and related material to Zimbabwe or to any person in 
Zimbabwe; 
 A prohibition on the transport of arms and related material to Zimbabwe aboard a 
Canadian vessel or aircraft; 
 A prohibition on the provision of technical or financial assistance or services relating to 
arms and related material, including the provision, transfer or communication of 
technical data, to Zimbabwe or any person in Zimbabwe; 
 Requirement on any person in Canada and Canadian outside of Canada to freeze the 
assets of listed Zimbabwean persons and entities; 
 A prohibition on Zimbabwean aircraft from flying over or landing in Canada. 
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human rights abuses and remove other blockages to democratization in the country” (Bomba & 
Minter, 2010). 
 
Since there are no formal trade sanctions business is still being conducted between Canada and 
Zimbabwe. The mining sector is the strongest example of the strong Canadian business interests in 
Zimbabwe. Firms such as New Dawn Mining Corporation owns and operates two gold mines the 
Turk and Angelus Mines. This ‘junior’ mining company generated USD$3.97 million in revenue 
for the 2009 fiscal year (New Dawn, 2010).  Another mine outside of Bulawayo has been owned 
and operated by three Canadian based mining companies since 1965, Falconbridge, Kinross and 
now Caledonia Mining Corporation. The Blanket Gold Mine generated USD$4.15 million in 
revenue in the second quarter of 2010 (Caledonia, 2010).  Both New Dawn and Caledonia are based 
in Toronto and are publicly traded companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Based on the profits 
of just two Canadian mining companies in Zimbabwe it is clear that there is still substantial 
business being conducted between both nations.  The targeted sanctions have not affected these 
Canadian based multi- national mining companies, though Canadians cannot formally conduct 
business with certain ZANU-PF members. It is unclear who exactly the Canadian sanctions against 
ZANU–PF members targets but it does include: “past or present senior officials of the Government 
of Zimbabwe, their families, entities that are owned or controlled by past or present senior officials 
or their families, and persons engaged in activities that undermine democracy, respect for human 
rights and the rule of law” (Sonsow, 2008). Similarly to the past, it is very difficult to enforce 
sanctions between Canada and Zimbabwe. This is especially true if it is not a global initiative.  
 
There is only one recent example of Canada actually being able to follow through with its targeted 
sanctions. In 2008, Mugabe requested to fly through Canadian airspace following a speech at the 
United Nations to which the government declined. This can be considered a “smart sanction,” but it 
is so minute that even the symbolic impact is unclear.  
 
Mugabe is able to mobilize his followers to react against the sanctions and fuel the fire of anti- 
westernization in the country.  He insists the dire state Zimbabwe is currently in is the west’s fault. 
He accuses the west of using sanctions “as part of a plot to impose their political will on the 
southern African nation” (Times Live, 2010c). In reality, the sanctions put in place against key 
ZANU-PF members do not have a grave effect on the general population. In truth, it has been the 
international community (with Canada included) that has fed the country since the constitutional 
crisis.  
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Most recently, in 2009, Canada along with twenty other nations released “a statement commending 
the progress undertaken by the transition government and urging the government to take additional 
steps to demonstrate its commitment to reform” (Government of Canada, 2009). If Zimbabwe 
shows a sustainable change towards a transparent and fair government Canada will reconsider its 
economic and political sanctions towards the country.  
 
4.5.2 CIDA and Zimbabwe  
 
Though the Government of Canada is no longer officially helping the government of Zimbabwe 
through its ODA, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) continues to help 
Zimbabweans who are in dire need of basic necessities. CIDA is active in numerous African 
countries including Sudan, Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In 2008 the Canadian 
government contributed CAD$2.1 billion in official development aid overall.  In 2002 the 
government promised to double its commitments to ODA by 2010, which it did but then promptly 
froze.  
 
 Canada’s $34 million contribution to Zimbabweans is rather basic.  It helps them to access water, 
healthcare, education and food. Overall, the commitment of funds to aid in Zimbabwe is to “prevent 
a further decline in peace, order, and governance in Zimbabwe…[while encouraging] respect for the 
rights of the individual” (CIDA 2010a). There is no money allotted to the government for fear it 
might go into the pockets of the ZANU- PF.  For the year 2010 there are approximately 44 
operational projects that Canada is involved with in Zimbabwe, either supported or headed by 
Canada (CIDA, 2010a).  The money allotted through CIDA is a bare minimum to try and help the 
population survive through various forms of aid such as food aid.  On the surface Canada is 
maintaining its middle power position, by providing minimal support whilst taking a political stand 
against Zimbabwe through its targeted sanctions.  
 
Under Stephen Harper it has become increasingly clear that the government is doubtful of 
commitments to global development. The minister responsible for CIDA, Bev Oda, is not even part 
of the Cabinet. The agency itself is bound by endless red tape. On average, it takes about 43 months 
for a project to gain approval though CIDA (Stewart, 2009). “CIDA time and again is suffocated by 
a political management system that rewards weakness and indecision, while shunning imagination” 
(Stewart, 2009). In the past ten years there has been a new minister in charge of CIDA every two 
years, just adding to the lack of direction and confusion plaguing the fledgling body.  It is clear that 
the government has been taking less and less interest in its own international development agency, 
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cutting recipient countries and freezing the budget. It has become apparent that the Canadian 
government does not value the middlepower stance that Canada was once lauded for.  
 
4.5.3 Zimbabwe and the Kimberley Process: The Last Vestiges of Canadian Middlepowermanship?  
 
Official involvement between Canada and Zimbabwe is limited. There is, however, the Kimberley 
Process that engages both.  The Kimberley Process is a global certification scheme which aims to 
put “extensive requirements on its members to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds 
as ‘conflict-free’ and prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate trade” (Kimberley 
Process, 2010). Canada takes a keen interest in the upholding of the Kimberley process because of 
its integral part of creating the diamond certifying process. Canada uses the Partnership Africa- 
Canada (PAC), a non- governmental organization, dedicated to ending the trade of “conflict” 
diamonds. PAC in 2009 recommended that Zimbabwe be suspended from the Kimberley Process as 
they violating the rules of accord. In a recent gesture of futility, the Canadian minister of foreign 
affairs Lawrence Cannon urged the Zimbabwean government to adhere to the Kimberley process.  
 
Since Zimbabwe’s suspension in 2009 it has drawn substantial global controversy about the 
diamond fields. After investigation into the diamond producing regions of Zimbabwe it was 
discovered that the government was not adhering to the regulations set out by the Kimberly Process.  
Workers were being forced into labour, torture and killing of local civilians around the area of the 
Military controlled mines.  The illegal control over the diamond mines is seen as “helping to prop 
up Robert Mugabe's repressive and violent regime and the military seems bent on keeping control 
of the Marange diamonds for their own personal needs, regardless of the needs of the local 
population” (PAC, 2009). Zimbabwe’s suspension from the process has enraged the octogenarian 
ruler and his cronies. They see the ban on diamonds from Zimbabwe as another tactic of the west to 
bring down Zimbabwe and enforce western ideals in the country.  
 
There is overwhelming evidence that the government and military are systematically undermining 
the Kimberley Process.  Recently, the sale of diamonds from disputed mine has been allowed. This 
mine “was blocked last year by the international regulator after it found that Zimbabwe had failed 
to comply with human rights standards” (The Times, 2010b). The government has spoken out 
against the Kimberley Process and seem to be disinterested in upholding the international standard. 
Even though Zimbabwe is a member of Kimberley Process the Minister of the Mines Obert Mpofu 
said that "We are going to benefit from our diamonds whether with the KP or not" (The Times, 
2010b). 
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As a traditional middle power and one of the creators of the Kimberley Process Canada has taken 
the stance to bar Zimbabwe from the process. By barring them there is hope that larger companies 
and other diamond traders will not buy the diamonds, as they are not certified as conflict- free. 
Canada’s involvement through the Kimberley Process is quintessential middle power action; they 
have joined forces with like-minded states to set an example for the diamond industry. However, 
this attempt at middlepowermanship has been ineffective. The Kimberley Processes is suffering and 
losing integrity, there is a “lack of political will to punish a country that condones violence and 
smuggling within its diamond industry. Such a failure is not only a massive blow to its credibility, 
but puts the entire process in jeopardy” (Campbell, 2009).  
 
One of the driving forces behind the Kimberley Processes, Ian Smillie, the former director of PAC 
has become critical of its effects. He argues that “the whole point of the Kimberley Process was to 
make sure that diamonds were clean, [and] that they're not hurting people…When you see serious 
human rights abuses taking place in diamond fields then surely it's a no-brainer [that something is 
wrong]." (Campbell, 2009). Canada’s involvement in the Kimberley Process is one of its most 
recent forays into middle power diplomacy. Its involvement in the creation of the certification 
scheme was essential. However, Mugabe and his ZANU- PF cronies are consistently undermining 
the once lauded process. “ If there are no consequences to violating the Kimberley Process, what 
incentives do other nations have to comply?” (Campbell, 2009). The Kimberley Process is another 
example of Canada’s all talk and little action behaviour. Despite the fact Canadians worked very 
hard to get the Kimberley process off the ground it has not been nearly as successful as had hoped.  
 
 The Zimbabwean government and military are not concerned with what the potential consequences 
of not adhering to the Kimberley Processes might be. The diamond industry in Zimbabwe 
exemplifies the rampant corruption and violence present under ZANU- PF. Mugabe emphasises the 
importance of the diamond industry to Zimbabwe’s recovery, however, in the long term it is not 
that essential. It has been estimated that the diamond industry contributes only $33 million USD per 
year to the economy (PAC,2009). "Zimbabwe is the test for the Kimberley Process to show the 
world it cares about human rights and is working to keep consumer confidence in the purity of 
diamonds" (PAC, 2009). This is an initiative that Canada can get behind to show its middle power 
and steadfast commitment to protecting human rights and democracy and upholding Canadian 
values. The Kimberley Process is a clear example of middle powers “utilizing and asserting 
themselves through international organizations, relying on the authority afforded [in] these 
institutions in order to manage and maintain the prevailing world order”  (Jordaan, 2003: 169).  By 
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creating and attempting to enforce a global protocol with regards to the diamond trade middle 
powers are trying to help keep consistency within the world order.  
 
The diamond trade might seem like an insignificant theme when examining the crisis in Zimbabwe 
but in reality it is very important, not only for Canada but for also examining the crisis as a whole. 
What is occurring presently can be mirrored with the choice of sending troops to the DRC. Similar 
to the conflict in DRC, the government stands to profit by illegal activities.  Through the diamond 
resources in the northwest ZANU-PF stands to profit greatly, upholding corruption and the standard 
of living which Mugabe and his cronies have become so used to. By Canada’s involvement in the 
Kimberley Process they are trying to prevent history repeating itself. Even though the Kimberley 
process is not officially attached to the Canadian government it does represent an initiative which 
Canada is a part of. It also shows Canada’s commitment as a middle power to try and uphold human 
rights.  
 
Canada as a traditional middle power advocates human rights and democracy. Since trade sanctions 
with Zimbabwe do not impact the Canadian population directly, it easy for the public to support.  
The population agrees with basic human rights, equal access to goods and political rights, and 
assumes rather than understands the consequences on Zimbabwe. The Kimberley process is an 
example of how “the strength and/or legitimacy of [an international] organisation [has been] 
quickly undermined” (Jordaan, 2003: 170). Canada and other traditional middle powers had the 
intention of creating a more transparent protocol and safer way of mining diamonds. However, like 
many internationalist initiatives it has left Zimbabwe unable to deal with problems such as 
“starvation, growing inequality, environmental degradation” (Jordaan, 2003: 170). Canada’s 
involvement in the Kimberley Processes is another example of its good intentions and little 
outcome.   
 
4.6 Conclusion: Looking to Future, Where Has Canada Gone?  
 
It is difficult to see where Canadian- Zimbabwean relations are headed in the future. Since Mugabe 
is vehemently anti- western there is “little room for negotiation on the bases of western- based 
conceptions of liberal rights and freedoms” (Black & Wilson, 2004: 41), and Harper will not change 
his policies unless he sees concrete change. At the World Economic Forum held in Davos 2010  
“Tsvangirai said he had been told by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper in a bilateral 
meeting at the WEF that the perception will remain "very negative" as long as Mugabe remains in 
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power” (Reuters, 2010). Unless the GNU can prove that there has been drastic improvement Harper 
will stand firm on his positioning against Zimbabwe.  
 
Canada will continue in its (somewhat) middlepower role by orchestrating basic aid through CIDA 
and working with other multi-lateral bodies. Recently, Canada has decided its foreign aid will be 
mainly focused on South America and has significantly decreased its presence in Southern Africa. 
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has chosen a path towards “stimulating 
economic growth” (CIDA, 2010c) which means a lessening of focus on Africa as a whole. This has 
been characteristic of the current Conservative government’s initiatives and trying to bring relations 
closer to home, where more of an impact can be seen.  Even former Conservative Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney argues that Canada is able to make a difference in Zimbabwe and that improving 
targeted assistance to southern Africa “makes sense” (Mulroney, 2008). Until Zimbabwe shows 
signs of major improvement in terms of electoral, governmental and humanitarian reform Canada 
will remain diligent on its current sanctions. However, the Canadian government tries to remain 
optimistic towards Zimbabwe, hoping that the government will continue to show signs of 
improvement so that sanctions can be lifted towards the country.  
 
Canada’s future relationship with Africa as a whole is a large question mark, let alone Canada’s 
relationship with Zimbabwe. As years have passed less and less countries are on the receiving end 
of Canadian aid and development.  In 2009 it was announced that only 20 countries would be the 
recipients of Canadian aid. Under previous governments, there were 14 counties in Africa who 
received aid from Canada but now that number has been stripped down to 7.6 The Harper 
government wants to turn its focus on “’our neighbourhood’ in the western hemisphere” (Kinsman, 
2008). This also means that many of the least developed countries in the world will not be receiving 
the ODA they so desperately need.  
 
Both Canadians and Africans are concerned about where the partnership is headed in the future. 
Canadians have a history of investing in Africa and “despair how that the prime minister has 
publicly appeared to downgrade the very countries they have laboured to build” (Schram, 2010: 
181). Other countries such as China are snatching all possibilities to invest in anywhere in Africa, 
even in Zimbabwe here it is extremely resource rich (Bassett, 2010). It is difficult to see why the 
government is pulling so much of its resources out of an entire continent when there is so much 
potential for return on investments.  
                                                 
6 The seven countries in Africa who are receiving ODA from Canada are: Sudan, Senegal, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Mali, Mozambique and Tanzania (CIDA, 2010c)  
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Botchwey (2010) suggests three reasons for Canada’s lessening role in Africa: the shift in political 
landscape, the global economic crisis and a lessening of Canada’s visibility in the global arena.  All 
three themes have validity. Canada in the past has pried itself on a good reputation and promoting 
human rights and democracy. Currently, the government’s focus has been turned inwards with a 
focus on monetary results. The declining economic position of Canada in the world plays into this, 
the rising unemployment rates at home makes the government wary of sending taxpayer’s money 
elsewhere. Lastly, there has been a shift in political landscape. Even though both Liberals and 
Conservatives have played a role in the focus of foreign policy the current Conservative 
government is fast- tracking Canada to be one of the least generous countries in the world. With a 
freeze in spending the government will not embark on new and risky projects.  
 
In the subsequent decades after the Second World War, the Canadian government was a keen voice 
for African issues, especially the Rhodesian question. Since that time both Liberal and Conservative 
governments’ participation and investment in Africa has dwindled, despite some ‘monumental’ 
attempts to increase funding. It has been suggested that current Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
“takes little interest in Africa” (Schram, 2010: 182).  This could be a result of a shaky minority 
government whose primary concern is with the United States and that has little knowledge or 
understanding of global issues (Schram, 2010: 182). 
 
There is also the issue of Canadian public opinion. African issues with relation to Canadian opinion 
are broad and shallow- lots of vocalization but never a priority. Canadian opinion is often 
influenced by opinion in other countries, and if there is a moral issue involved the public tends to 
make demands that are disproportionate to the Canada’s abilities. This was true in the 1980s under 
Mulroney, through the 1990s with Chrétien and is most certainly true now with Stephen Harper.  
Throughout his multilateral commitments such as NEPAD it seemed as if Chrétien did have an 
interest in Africa. Unfortunately there was neither the proper funding nor the strong public opinion 
to support his ideas. 
 
By looking at Canada’s ODA relative to the GDI (Graph 3) it is clear that its middle power position 
is declining steadily not only with regards to Zimbabwe, but also the rest of the developing world. 
The ODA ratio has steadily declined in the past 20 years. Throughout the Trudeau and Mulroney 
years Canada’s ODA hovered around .5 percent; today it stands at about .32% (Bassett, 2010). 
Unfortunately, this number will only decrease from now on. Jean Chrétien promised to double aid 
to Africa by 2010, this has been completed and promptly frozen. Since the Conservative 
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government took over fewer countries have been recipients of aid. By the time this freeze has 
worked its way through the system the ratio will lie at .32% (less than half of the .7% goal). 
Canada’s GNI is rising but the aid being given is not.  
 
Looking at Canada’s relationship with Zimbabwe exemplifies its declining status as a middle 
power. Once a country, who championed human rights, multilateralism and peace has fallen from 
its pedestal. With this in mind it makes Canada’s future partnership with Africa bleaker. There is 
less funding going to the entire continent. Additionally, there is a long confusing bureaucratic 
backlog which further discourages initiatives. If it takes roughly 43 months for a project to be 
approved people will get frustrated and not want to use the once important body. Canada’s future in 
Zimbabwe and the other 52 African countries is uncertain, there is little time, energy and money for 
CIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to create a new plan or 
Africa (Schram, 2010: 186).  
 
If the current government puts so little value in CIDA and the help it gives to those across the 
continent it will only be a matter of time before Canada’s helpful reputation is lost. With the current 
government, there have not even been any symbolic gestures towards the African continent, 
furthering the growing pessimistic view of Canada. Historically Canada acted with the 
Commonwealth or the UN to promote change within Zimbabwe- something it could not do alone. 
Canada cannot be an independent variable in the Zimbabwe crisis but a leader of change and 
reform. The willingness or availability of other powers is crucial to our being able to do anything.  
Even with both the G8 and the G20 summits being held in Canada in the summer of 2010 there was 
little to no attention paid to Africa. It is almost impossible to see Canada’s middle power status 
being regained any time soon. Its lacklustre commitments and declining middle power status have 
made them less relevant in the global order. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The focus of this thesis was to examine Canada’s evolution into middle power status and assess 
whether or not it has been upheld in the current global order. By using Jordaan’s framework it is 
easy to see that Canada did at one point fit the role as a traditional middle power, but now falls short 
of fitting into the theoretical framework Jordaan created.   
 
As Chapnick argues (2000), even in 1945 Canada might have overestimated the importance of its 
contribution to the world order. However, using some of the indicators outlined by Jordaan, 
between 1945 and 1957 Canada was genuinely important in terms of its relative standing 
economically, and also militarily. Canada cultivated alliance skills and made a very important 
contribution to the NATO alliance, in the Commonwealth and at the United Nations. Canada came 
to specialize in ending quarrels (among others) and boosting alliance spirits. There is no doubt that 
Canada championed the middle power persona in the post war era and through parts of the Cold 
War. Today, however, its place as a middle power is in doubt. 
 
In the end, the decline of Canada’s middle power status was inevitable. The government made the 
choices it did and only now people are asking why Canada no longer has the same political clout as 
it once did. The slowdown of the economy paired with the recovery of Europe, the choice to invest 
in universal healthcare and pensions refocused the country domestically, as opposed to 
internationally. The lack of military funding led to a decreased capacity for peacekeeping. The 
financial retrenchment of the 1990s had repercussions for the military and ODA. This impacted the 
hard and soft power Canada was able to exert in the world order. Canada’s involvement in 
Zimbabwe illustrates its waning middle power behaviour. Canada once was the only white member 
of the Commonwealth arguing for better governance in Rhodesia. Today, Canada has stood back 
and barely contributes to trying to resolve the devastating crisis in Zimbabwe. The global order is 
shifting and Canada can no longer sit comfortably in the middle. Many of the countries who relied 
on Canadian assistance to maintain that order are no longer looking to Canada for help.  
 
The question remains, where is Canada going? Unfortunately it is not headed in the direction of a 
traditional middle power. Canada has shifted its development policies to focus within the Americas 
as opposed to the least developed countries in other parts of the world. It is increasingly clear that 
there is an economic agenda underneath its development policies, as opposed to being a helpful 
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fixer. In the eyes of many Canadians, Canada is the beacon of good governance while remaining 
“generous, affluent, engaged and important, that it is fulfilling its promise in the world” (Cohen, 
2003:21). This perception of the traditional middle power has become an outdated legacy.  
 
Similarly, the subject of whether or not Canada can be considered a traditional middle power has 
become increasingly relevant, especially in recent years, as Canada has made attempts to reassert 
itself on the world stage. Canada as a member of many multi-lateral bodies has tried to show its 
middle power influence, by hosting the G8/20 summits in 2010 Canada has proven that it is not up 
to fulfilling the role. With the recent failure of Canada to gain a coveted seat on the Security 
Council, Stephen Harper is faced with a difficult predicament. He either needs to  “acknowledge 
this rebuke from the global community and rethink how his government presents Canada to the 
world, or ignore it and accept an outsider status unique in this country’s history” (Ibbitson & Slater, 
2010).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the thesis putting forward some of the main points 
discussed.  The second part of this chapter traces the progression of the thesis, from the formulation 
of the research question, to examining the different theories of middle powers, to the final analysis. 
Finally, recommendations for further research are then advanced. 
 
5.2 Progression  
 
The thesis progressed from the initial question of whether or not Canada can still be considered a 
middle power. The first step to answering the question began with an investigation into different 
concepts of middle power theory. After this each concept’s validity was examined, based on their 
strengths and weaknesses. The strongest middle power theory was chosen as a base of analysis. 
This theory, presented by Eduard Jordaan, gave the best platform for further research. Many of the 
other middle power theories were not effective in analyzing Canada’s middle power status, 
especially when using Zimbabwe as a case study. Some of the theories could not be transposed on 
either a global scale, or a smaller specific scale. Similarly, these older theories of 
middlepowermanship did not take into account the changing global order to accommodate 
emerging middle powers. After understanding middle power theory it became much easier to 
contextualize the emergence of middle power status and understand why they are important in the 
world order.    
 
This led to the application of Jordaan’s middle power theory to Canada, looking at specific 
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elements which have contributed to Canada’s emergence as a middle power in the post war era. 
Once the main characteristics of Canadian middlepowermanship were identified it became easier to 
direct the research towards dissecting Canadian middle power status in the 21st century. Elements of 
hard and soft power were reoccurring within the literature; they were included and applied to 
middle power theory to understand how elements of both are necessary to uphold middle power 
status.  
 
Three themes were then chosen to show exactly how and why Canada’s middle power status has 
been declining over the past decades, starting with the economy.  The economic slowdown that 
Canada experienced in the 1970s paired with the introduction of universal healthcare helped lessen 
its middle power status. This slowdown had ripple effects all over the Canadian government; the 
military was receiving less money and as a result was not able to participate in as many 
peacekeeping missions as before. When Canada did participate in two missions in the 1990s they 
were understaffed and underfunded and both missions turned out to be catastrophic endeavours. 
Another ripple effect took place in Canada’s ODA; over the past decades (Graph 3) Canada has 
been contributing less and less when compared to other traditional middle powers. These factors 
contributed to the waning of Canada’s hard and soft power- two essential elements for upholding 
the middle power persona.  
 
The final step in the research began with investigating Canada’s relationship with Rhodesia/ 
Zimbabwe throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.  While its position in the world order was on the 
rise, Canada was able to harness its newly found power in the global order to promote change and 
human rights especially through the Commonwealth. Post independence, Canada supported 
Zimbabwean initiatives, such as denouncing apartheid in South Africa or Prime Minister Mulroney 
visiting Zimbabwe in 1987.  When the country slid into a state of crisis Canada did not adopt its 
role as a helpful fixer for those in need, by enacting targeted sanctions against the ZANU- PF. The 
Canadian government did not use its middle power in global bodies or on its own to help people 
caught in the middle.  
 
Through the research done on Canadian- Zimbabwean relations in the 20th and 21st century it 
became increasingly evident that Canada was no longer able to uphold its middle power position. 
Despite the role the Canadian government worked so hard to build up throughout the 1960s the 
government has not been able to maintain its middle power status. By choosing Zimbabwe as the 
focal point of research, it clearly shows the evolution of how Canada was able to rise to middle 
power status and then its subsequent decline. 
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The relationship shared between Canada and Zimbabwe exemplifies the decline in Canada’s middle 
power status. Canada was once very involved and vocal within the Commonwealth to support the 
Zimbabwean cause. But in recent years the Canadian government has done less to help the people 
in Zimbabwe as the crisis has become more severe. By passing sanctions, and withdrawing ODA 
the Canadian government has separated itself from the crisis.  Further research shows that Canada 
has committed less and less to nations who are in the direst need; instead ODA has been targeted to 
20 nations mostly within the western hemisphere. Canada’s relationship with Zimbabwe shows that 
Canada can no longer commit itself to upholding the middle power status it worked so hard to 
solidify. This led to the conclusion that Canada can no longer be considered a traditional middle 
power.  
 
5.3 Areas for Further Investigation  
 
Questioning Canada’s role as a traditional middle power is an emerging trend that goes against 
decades of scholarship in Canada (Chapnick, 2000). By using Jordaan’s framework it becomes clear 
that Canada’s middle power status has been on a steady decline for a long time.  However, by using 
the same theoretical framework, the research also confirms that Canada was in fact, once a middle 
power. The thesis incorporates both new and old analysis to show the evolution of Canadian 
middlepowermanship.   
 
The results of the research show that Canada can no longer be viewed as a traditional middle power. 
This fact impacts the way in which Canada is classified and raises further questions of where 
exactly it fits in the world order. Based on Jordaan’s theory Canada does not possess any of the 
attributes of an emerging middle power. On the other hand, Canada is losing many of its 
characteristics which Jordaan points out are essential for a traditional middle power.  This opens up 
a space for further research- finding out where Canada fits in the 21st century global order. By 
further examining middle power theory (both emerging and traditional), might shed some light on 
where Canada’s current and future standing as a middle power might lie.  Also, a more in-depth 
investigation to the debates surrounding the idea of emerging middle powers and asking what role 
in the global order they play would further strengthen the paper. 
 
When examining Canada’s waning middle power role, future research should focus exclusively on 
Canada’s roles within multi-lateral bodies and processes, such as the Commonwealth, G20, the UN 
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or the Kimberley Process. Multi-lateral bodies are a good example of how the government reacts to 
issues within a controlled environment and implements its policies through another body. By 
examining which issues a country gets involved in within a global body, especially issues which do 
not directly pertain to that country can gauge a nations commitment to middle power initiatives.  
Canada’s role in the creation of the Responsibility to Protect, the set of principles that aims to 
enforce a global set of responsibilities, in the area of human security would be another valuable 
avenue to explore as an example of Canada’s commitment to middlepowermanship. This thesis 
provides a good overview of Canada’s relationship with Zimbabwe through many different facets of 
interaction, but it would be stronger (if space permitted) if it were based on an in-depth examination 
of one or two multi-lateral bodies such as the Commonwealth and the Kimberley Process.  
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